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Abstract. We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strate-
gic simplicity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple
mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a
mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs
about the other agents’ preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents’
rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, be-
cause such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy
mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically
simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than
dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting prob-
lem.
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1. Introduction
In mechanism design it seems useful to distinguish mechanisms in which agents face
a straightforward choice problem from mechanisms that require agents to engage in
complex thinking if they want to determine their optimal choices. In some cases, the
mechanism designer might prefer a mechanism of the former type. There are several
conceivable reasons for such a preference. For example, the mechanism designer might
not be able to predict the behavior of agents who are not capable of complex thinking.
Or the mechanism designer might find it desirable that the outcomes of a mechanism
don’t depend much on the cognitive abilities of the agents. Of course, one can also
imagine settings in which the mechanism designer prefers mechanisms that make it
hard for agents to find an optimal strategy.
In this paper, we introduce a property of mechanisms that is intended to capture the
idea that strategic choices are simple in a particular way: agents don’t need to have
much strategic sophistication to determine their optimal strategies. Here we mean by
“strategic sophistication” the ability to reason about the other agents’ preferences,
the other agents’ beliefs, their beliefs about beliefs, etc. That forming higher-order
beliefs is difficult seems plausible from everyday experience, and there is also some
recent experimental evidence that points into this direction; see, for example, Alaoui
and Penta [1].
There are, of course, many other dimensions to simplicity. For example, the sheer
size of the strategy space and the complexity of the mapping that assigns outcomes to
strategy combinations may make a mechanism difficult to understand. One may also
consider the computational complexity of finding optimal strategies. In settings in
which the agents interact repeatedly, one may consider how easy it is for the agents
to learn through repeated play.1 The purpose of this paper is to isolate just one
dimension of simplicity, and to consider one possible formalization of this dimension.
One class of mechanisms which require little strategic sophistication is the class of
dominant strategy mechanisms.2 In dominant strategy mechanisms, agents need not
think at all about the motives of the other agents, or the other agents’ rationality.
1Mathevet [21] introduces an approach to construct supermodular mechanisms. Supermodular
mechanisms are desirable in settings in which the agents interact repeatedly and in settings in which
learning and adjusting are important.
2A dominant strategy mechanism is a mechanism in which each agent has a dominant strategy
regardless of her preference. We use the phrase “dominant strategy” in the sense in which it is used
in mechanism design theory, that is, a strategy that is optimal regardless of what the other agents
do. This is slightly different from “weakly dominant” or “strictly dominant” strategies as these
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This is because each agent has at least one strategy that is optimal regardless of what
the other agents do, and she can just choose such a strategy.
For many mechanism design problems, the class of dominant strategy mechanisms
is quite small, and only includes mechanisms that are rather unattractive for a mech-
anism designer who wants to maximize, say, revenue, or welfare.3 We therefore in-
troduce in this paper a new class of mechanisms that includes, but is strictly larger
than, the set of dominant strategy mechanisms. We call the mechanisms in this class
“strategically simple.” We argue that for mechanisms in this new class the strategic
sophistication needed to find optimal strategies is quite limited. Our results show
that in applications the set of strategically simple mechanisms includes mechanisms
that are more attractive to a mechanism designer concerned with fairness, efficiency,
or revenue, than dominant strategy mechanisms.
The following example illustrates our idea. Consider the well-known problem of
designing a mechanism that allows a seller of an indivisible object to trade with one
potential buyer. Both agents have quasi-linear preferences. It is known from Hagerty
and Rogerson [17] that the only dominant strategy mechanisms that satisfy ex post
budget balance and individual rationality are posted price mechanisms. In a posted
price mechanism, the designer chooses a (possibly random) price, without taking into
account any of the agents’ private information. The outcome depends on agents’
private information only through their decision to trade, or not to trade, at the price
proposed by the mechanism designer. Trade comes about only when both agents
agree. Obviously, this is a rather unappealing mechanism for a welfare maximizing
mechanism designer.
Now consider an alternative mechanism that we call “price cap mechanism.” The
mechanism designer sets a price cap. The seller can refuse to trade, or choose a price
less than or equal to the mechanism designer’s price cap, and indicate that he is
willing to trade at this price, or at a lower price. If the seller is willing to trade, then
the buyer can decides whether or not to trade at the price chosen by the seller. Trade
takes only place if both agents agree to trade.
Whether or not to reduce the price, and how far to reduce the price, depends on
the seller’s belief about the buyer’s willingness to pay. But, regardless of her belief,
the seller will never reduce the price below her reservation value, and the buyer will
terms are defined in game theory. Dominant strategy mechanisms are also called “strategy-proof”
mechanisms in the literature.
3See the examples in Chapter 4 of Bo¨rgers [7].
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never agree to trade if the potentially reduced price is above his willingness to pay. In
comparison to the posted price mechanism, this mechanism facilitates more efficient
trade.4
In the price cap mechanism, the buyer faces a straightforward choice problem.
The buyer agrees to trade if and only if his willingness to pay is weakly higher than
the price offered. The seller’s problem is arguably not too complicated either. If she
believes that the buyer accepts the trade if and only if his willingness to pay is weakly
higher than the price offered, then all that she needs to do is to consider her belief
about the buyer’s willingness to pay. This problem is equivalent to the standard
monopoly problem with a price ceiling, as taught in undergraduate microeconomics.
For any belief that the seller might have, it is a straightforward optimization problem.
Our formal definition of strategic simplicity will imply that the price cap mechanism
is strategically simple.
On the other hand, the double auction described in Chatterjee and Samuelson [9]
is, in our terminology, not strategically simple. To see why, note that in the double
auction, the seller has to form her belief about the price that the buyer offers. Ideally,
she would like to ask for a price that is as close as possible to, but not above the price
that is offered by the buyer, provided that this price is above her reservation value.
But to form her belief about the price that the buyer offers, presumably the seller
first has to form her belief about the buyer’s belief about the seller’s reservation
value. Similarly, the buyer has to form his belief about the seller’s belief about
the buyer’s willingness to pay. Potentially, infinitely many layers of such beliefs
matter. Mechanisms that require of agents this level of depth of thinking will, in our
terminology, not be strategically simple.
Motivated by this example, we define in this paper a mechanism to be strategically
simple if optimal choices can be determined using first-order beliefs alone, and there
is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs because such beliefs are irrelevant
to the optimal strategies. Here, we are referring to beliefs about the other agents’
utility functions and rationality. Thus, a “first-order belief” of agent i is agent i’s
belief about the other agents’ (j ‰ i) utility functions, and about the other agents’
rationality. “Higher-order beliefs” are, for example, agent i’s belief about agent j’s
belief about agent i’s utility function, and about agent j’s belief about agent i’s
rationality. We shall call a mechanism strategically simple if for each agent i, her
4This mechanism was discussed in Bo¨rgers and Smith [8].
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belief about the other agents’ (j ‰ i) utility functions, combined with certainty that
the other agents are rational, imply which choices are optimal for agent i.5
Our definition of strategic simplicity allows for the possibility that only some subset
of all utility functions and some subset of all first-order beliefs are considered relevant
for the determination whether or not a mechanism is strategically simple. Our main
result shows that, under a “richness” condition on the domain of relevant utility func-
tions and first-order beliefs, strategic simplicity is equivalent to a “local dictatorship”
property. The richness condition will be formally defined later, but we emphasize
that it is much weaker than the requirement that all possible utility functions and all
possible first-order beliefs are in the domain. In contrast with (classical) dictatorship,
local dictatorship means, roughly speaking, that there is some agent who dictates the
outcome if we restrict attention for every agent to certain subset of her strategy set.
The identity of the dictator may depend on the subsets that we consider. Every
dictatorship mechanism is a local dictatorship mechanism, but there are many more
local dictatorship mechanisms than dictatorship mechanisms, including mechanisms
that are far from what in everyday language is called a “dictatorship.” For example,
a voting mechanism in which one agent selects two alternatives from a larger set of
several alternatives, and the other agents then vote over those two alternatives using
majority voting, is in our language a local dictatorship.
Our characterization result suggests a natural division of strategically simple mech-
anisms into two categories: mechanisms in which there is some agent who is a local
dictator at all restrictions that we consider, and mechanisms in which this is not the
case. We shall call the former “type 1 strategically simple mechanisms,” and the latter
“type 2 strategically simple mechanisms.” Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms
are easy to characterize. One can think of type 1 strategically simple mechanisms as
“delegation mechanisms:” the mechanism designer delegates the choice of the mecha-
nism to a “delegate,” who chooses a mechanism from a given set of dominant strategy
mechanisms that the designer has specified. Then the other agents play this dominant
strategy mechanism. The delegate’s choice will depend on her first-order belief, while
the other agents’ choices don’t require any belief formation. Type 1 strategically sim-
ple mechanisms include, as a subclass, all dominant strategy mechanisms. The price
cap mechanism presented above is also a type 1 strategically simple mechanism.
5It is, of course, somewhat arbitrary to restrict attention to mechanisms for which only first-order
beliefs matter. We might instead allow first and second-order beliefs to matter, for example. We
discuss such variations in Section 8.
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Type 2 strategically simple mechanisms are harder to characterize in general. In-
stead, after presenting general results, we shall analyze in this paper two applications.
In these applications we will be able to characterize not only type 1 but also, under
some assumptions, type 2 strategically simple mechanisms.
The first application that we study is the bilateral trade problem. We show that the
type 1 strategically simple mechanisms are those in which one agent proposes terms
of trade, and the other agent accepts or rejects. We then show that there are no type
2 strategically simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment. Thus, we fully
characterize strategically simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment.
The second application that we study is the voting problem. In the voting envi-
ronment, the class of strategically simple mechanisms is much larger than the class
of dominant strategy mechanisms. By the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite [15, 24]
Theorem, in the voting environment as we define it here, a mechanism has dominant
strategies if and only if it is dictatorial. There are many more strategically simple
voting mechanisms. In this paper, we characterize type 1 strategically simple voting
mechanisms and we characterize type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms when
there are two agents and three alternatives. For this special case we show that there
is a type 2 strategically simple mechanism that is anonymous, that is, that treats
both voters equally. By contrast, no type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and, in
particular, no dominant strategy mechanism, is anonymous in this setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the formal definition of strate-
gic simplicity, and Section 3 provides an example to illustrate this notion. Section
4 contains our characterization result of strategically simple mechanisms under a
richness condition on the domain of utility functions and beliefs. Sections 5 and 6
consider the applications of our main results in the bilateral trade problem and the
voting problem. Section 7 reviews the related literature. Section 8 is a discussion of
open questions.
2. Definitions
There are n agents: i P I “ t1, 2, . . . , nu and a finite set A of outcomes. A
mechanism consists of a finite strategy set Si for each agent i, and an outcome function
g :
Ś
iPI Si Ñ A that describes for each choice of strategies which outcome will
result. We define S ”
Ś
iPI Si with generic element s, and, for every i P I, we define
S´i ”
Ś
j‰i Sj with generic element s´i. We assume that there are no duplicate
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strategies: for every i P I, for all si, s
1
i P Si with si ‰ s
1
i, there is some s´i P S´i such
that gpsi, s´iq ‰ gps
1
i, s´iq.
A von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function of agent i is a function ui :
A Ñ R. We define U to be the set of all utility functions such that: uipaq ‰
uipa
1q whenever a ‰ a1, minaPA uipaq “ 0, and maxaPA uipaq “ 1. Thus we rule
out indifferences and normalize utility. This simplifies arguments below. We write
u ” pu1, u2, . . . , unq and u´i ” pujqj‰i.
For every agent i, there is a non-empty and Borel-measurable set Ui Ď U of utility
functions that are possible utility functions of agent i. We allow for the possibility
that Ui ‰ U to be able to capture assumptions such as the assumption that agents’
utility functions are quasi-linear. We define U ”
Ś
iPI Ui, and, for every i P I, we
define U´i ”
Ś
j‰iUj .
For a given mechanism, for every i and every ui P Ui, we denote by UDipuiq the
set of all strategies that are not weakly dominated for agent i with utility function
ui, where weak dominance may be by a pure or by a mixed strategy. If u P U,
we define UDpuq ”
Ś
iPI UDipuiq. For every i P I and every u´i P U´i, we define
UD´ipu´iq ”
Ś
j‰i UDjpujq. To avoid tedious detail, we assume that for every agent
i P I and every strategy si P Si, there is at least some ui P Ui such that si P UDipuiq.
A “utility belief” µi of agent i is a Borel probability measure on U´i. We interpret
µi as agent i’s “first-order” belief. Higher-order beliefs would be beliefs about other
agents’ beliefs about utility functions, etc. As indicated in the introduction, we want
to focus on mechanisms in which higher-order beliefs play no role. Therefore, we
don’t formally define such beliefs here.
For any finite set (or Borel subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space) X , we
shall denote by ∆pXq the set of all (Borel) probability measures on X . The set of
all possible utility beliefs of agent i is some non-empty subset Mi of ∆pU´iq. We
allow for the possibility that Mi ‰ ∆pU´iq to be able to capture assumptions such
as the assumption that every agent believes that the other agents’ utility functions
are stochastically independent. We define M ”
Ś
iPIMi, and, for every i P I, we
define M´i ”
Ś
j‰iMj , and we denote typical elements of these sets by µ and µ´i
respectively.
A “strategic belief” µˆi of agent i is a probability measure on S´i: µˆi P ∆pS´iq.
Strategic beliefs are needed for agents to determine expected utility maximizing
strategies. The next definition will describe how agents may derive a strategic belief
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from a utility belief. We assume that agents are certain that the other agents do not
play weakly dominated strategies. Then, loosely speaking, a strategic belief can be
obtained from a given utility belief by dividing the probability assigned to any utility
function uj pj ‰ iq in some arbitrary way among the not weakly dominated strategies
of agent j with utility function uj. We call a strategic belief that can be derived
in this way from a utility belief “compatible with the utility belief.” Obviously, for
a given utility belief, there may be many compatible strategic beliefs. We formally
define the compatibility of strategic beliefs with utility beliefs as follows:
Definition 1. A strategic belief µˆi is “compatible with a utility belief µi” if there is a
probability measure νi on S´i ˆU´i that has support iną
j‰i
tpsj, ujq P Sj ˆUj |sj P UDjpujqu
and that has marginals µˆi on S´i and µi on U´i.
In this definition, νi is agent i’s joint belief about strategies and utility functions
of the other agents. Agent i’s certainty that the other agents don’t play weakly
dominated strategies is captured by the support restriction in Definition 1. The
belief νi must also reflect the given utility belief µi of agent i, that is, νi’s marginal
on U´i must be µi. The marginal on S´i is then a compatible strategic belief. We
denote the set of all strategic beliefs that are compatible with a given utility belief µi
by Mipµiq.
Given a utility function ui P Ui and a strategic belief µˆi P ∆pS´iq of agent i,
we denote by BRipui, µˆiq the set of all strategies in UDipuiq that maximize expected
utility in Si.
We are now ready to provide the key definition of this paper.
Definition 2. A mechanism is “strategically simple” with respect to U and M6 if for
every agent i, every utility function ui P Ui, and every utility belief µi PMi,č
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq ‰ H.
What we require here for every agent i, every utility function ui of agent i, and every
utility belief µi of agent i, is that agent i has at least one strategy that maximizes
expected utility regardless of which compatible strategic belief µˆi agent i picks. Thus,
6Whether a given mechanism is strategically simple or not depends on the domain of utility
function U and the domain of first-order beliefs M that we study. For simplicity, we sometimes
drop the quantifier “with respect to U and M” when there is no confusion.
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there is no need for agent i to try to distinguish more plausible from less plausible
compatible strategic beliefs. If that was necessary, it may be helpful for agent i to
form higher-order beliefs. But if a mechanism is strategically simple, there is no
benefit to agent i from forming higher-order beliefs.
Remark 1. If agent i with utility function ui has a weakly dominant strategy, then
this strategy is included in BRipui, µˆiq regardless of what µˆi is, and the intersection re-
ferred to in Definition 2 is non-empty because it includes the dominant strategy. Dom-
inant strategy mechanisms, in which all agents for all utility functions have dominant
strategies, are therefore trivially “strategically simple.”
Remark 2. In the definition of compatible strategic beliefs (Definition 1), we allow
agents to incorporate correlations into their beliefs about the other agents’ strategies
that go beyond the correlations implied by correlations in utility beliefs and the re-
quirement that not weakly dominated strategies are played. As is well known, without
allowing for arbitrary correlations in strategic beliefs, the equivalence between not
dominated strategies and expected utility maximizing strategies need not hold. This
equivalence is invoked in our proofs. We have not pursued how our analysis would
change if we did not allow such correlations.
Remark 3. One might conjecture that our definition of strategic simplicity of a mech-
anism is equivalent to the requirement that the mechanism, appropriately transformed
into an incomplete information game, is dominance solvable in two steps, where the
first step eliminates weakly dominated strategies and the second step eliminates strictly
dominated strategies. A statement very similar to this is indeed true, except that we
do not require that after two steps of the elimination procedure for every type7 a single
strategy is left over, but rather, that every type has at least one strategy that is optimal
for every strategic belief about the other types’ remaining strategies. This perspective
on our definition facilitates comparison with the requirement that every type have a
dominant strategy, because that just means that the elimination of dominated strate-
gies stops after one step. Nonetheless, we have found the definition used in this paper
in terms of first-order beliefs expresses more directly the intuitive idea on which this
paper is based.
Often a mechanism designer’s interest is not in the mechanism itself, but in the
outcomes that result when agents pick their strategies rationally. For strategically
simple mechanisms, which strategy maximizes expected utility will depend not only
on an agent’s utility function, but also on this agent’s utility belief. It is therefore
7Here, a “type” must be interpreted as a pair consisting of a utility function and a utility belief.
STRATEGICALLY SIMPLE MECHANISMS 9
natural to focus on correspondences that map utility functions and utility beliefs into
sets of outcomes. We call such correspondences “outcome correspondences.”
Definition 3. The “outcome correspondence” associated with a mechanism that is
strategically simple with respect to U and M is the correspondence:
F : U ˆM։ A
defined by:
F pu, µq ” g
¨
˝ą
iPI
¨
˝ č
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq
˛
‚
˛
‚ for all pu, µq P UˆM.
The following definition will be useful:
Definition 4. Two strategically simple mechanisms are “equivalent” if the outcome
correspondences associated with these two mechanisms are the same.
The literature already contains the concept of a “social choice correspondence.”
Social choice correspondences are similar to “outcome correspondences,” except that
their domain consists of profiles of utility functions (or preferences) only, and does not
include profiles of first-order beliefs. Focusing on utility functions in the domain seems
natural if one gives the correspondence a normative interpretation, as a reflection of
the outcomes that the mechanism designer regards desirable. Here, however, we give
our correspondence a positive interpretation: it is a description of the end result
of a given mechanism. By including the first-order beliefs in the domain, we give a
more detailed description of the consequences resulting from rational choice in a given
mechanism than we would obtain if only preference profiles were in the domain.
Our definition of outcome correspondences assumes that for any given utility func-
tion ui and utility belief µi agent i will only choose strategies from the setč
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq.
This implies that an agent i will not choose a strategy if it is a best response to only
some strategic beliefs compatible with the agent’s given utility belief, but not to all
compatible strategic beliefs. This assumption is in the spirit of our basic hypothesis
that agents find it costly to refine their strategic beliefs, beyond making it compatible
with their utility belief, and will avoid doing so if they can.
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One can interpret singleton-valued outcome correspondences as direct mechanisms
in which agents report their utility functions and their utility beliefs. Using this inter-
pretation, one can then ask whether a revelation principle holds, i.e.: If a singleton-
valued outcome correspondence is implemented by a strategically simple mechanism,
is then the direct mechanism defined by the outcome correspondence itself a strate-
gically simple mechanism, and is truth telling an optimal strategy for all utility func-
tions and first-order beliefs, regardless of higher-order beliefs, in this mechanism?
Unfortunately, a technical problem that we encounter when asking this question is
that we have defined strategically simple mechanisms only for the case that a mech-
anism has a finite strategy set for each agent, whereas we have allowed the sets of
pairs of utility functions and beliefs to be infinite, and thus the direct mechanism may
have infinite strategy sets. This problem is bypassed if attention is restricted to the
case of finite U ˆM. In this case, one can then verify that the revelation principle
as described above holds. Some of our analysis below is specifically about the case
of infinite U ˆM and finite mechanisms, and therefore the revelation principle will
not play an important role in our analysis, in contrast to the conventional theory of
mechanism design.
The formal framework developed in this section suggests two possible focuses for
our analysis: the characterization of strategically simple mechanisms and the char-
acterization of outcome correspondences that are associated with strategically simple
mechanisms. We find it convenient to focus on mechanisms themselves. But we shall
explain some of the implications of our results for outcome correspondences.
3. An Example
In this section, we provide an example to illustrate the mechanics of our definition
of strategically simple mechanisms. Consider the mechanism in Figure 1.8 In this
mechanism, agent 1 (he, the row player) and agent 2 (she, the column player) collec-
tively choose an outcome from three alternatives ta, b, cu. In what follows, we shall
apply Definition 2 and show that this mechanism is strategically simple with respect
to the full domain U2 ˆ p∆pUqq2.
We have to show that each agent can find an expected utility maximizing strategy
on the basis of first-order belief alone. This is obvious for both agents if they rank a or
b highest because then they have weakly dominant strategies. Also if u1pcq ą u1pbq ą
u1paq agent 1 has a weakly dominant strategy, as has agent 2 if u2pcq ą u2paq ą u2pbq.
8This mechanism is of special importance in Section 6.
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L C1 C2 R
T a a a a
M1 a b a b
M2 a b c b
B a b c c
Figure 1. A strategically simple mechanism
Thus, we have only two cases with multiple not weakly dominated strategies: T
and B are not weakly dominated for agent 1 if u1pcq ą u1paq ą u1pbq, and C2 and
R are not weakly dominated for agent 2 if u2pcq ą u2pbq ą u2paq. For any first-order
belief µ1 of agent 1, the set of compatible strategic beliefs M1pµ1q is:
9
M1pµ1q “
!
µˆ1 : µˆ1pLq “ µ1pabcq ` µ1pacbq,
µˆ1pC1q “ µ1pbacq ` µ1pbcaq,
µˆ1pC2q “ µ1pcabq ` x,
µˆ1pRq “ µ1pcbaq ´ x,
where 0 ď x ď µ1pcbaq
)
.
The multiplicity of compatible strategic beliefs is because for agent 2 with utility
u2pcq ą u2pbq ą u2paq, both C2 and R are not weakly dominated. Therefore, agent
1 cannot pin down the strategic belief on the basis of his first-order belief alone.
Nevertheless, in this mechanism, agent 1 with utility u1pcq ą u1paq ą u1pbq only
cares about the probability of agent 2 playing C1 and the total probability of agent
2 playing C2 and R. Hence, despite the multiplicity of compatible strategic beliefs,
agent 1 with utility u1pcq ą u1paq ą u1pbq has a strategy that is a best response to
any of the compatible strategic beliefs. In other words, agent 1 can determine his
expected utility maximizing strategy on the basis of his first-order belief alone. Using
similar arguments, one can check that agent 2 with preference cba can determine her
expected utility maximizing strategy on the basis of her first-order belief alone.
9In what follows we write µ1pabcq to denote the probability that agent 1 attaches to agent 2’s
utility satisfying u2paq ą u2pbq ą u2pcq, and we use analogous notation for the probabilities of other
orderings of a, b, and c.
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4. Characterization
We now provide a characterization result for strategically simple mechanisms under
a richness assumption regarding the sets of relevant utility functions and first-order be-
liefs. We denote by R the set of all reflexive, complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric
preference relations over the set of alternatives A. A generic element of R will be
denoted by Ri, where the index refers to agent i, and we denote by Pi the asymmetric
part of Ri. Every utility function ui P U induces a preference relation in the following
way: aRibô uipaq ě uipbq and aPibô uipaq ą uipbq. We denote by UpRiq the set of
all utility functions in U that induce Ri.
Next, we extend the notion of weak dominance to the case that only pure strategy
dominance is considered. In this case, only the preference Ri induced by agent i’s
utility function ui matters.
Definition 5. Let Ri P R. A strategy si P Si is “weakly dominated given Ri” if there
is another strategy sˆi P Si such that
gpsˆi, s´iqRi gpsi, s´iq
for all s´i P S´i and
gpsˆi, s´iqPi gpsi, s´iq
for some s´i P S´i.
For any Ri P R, we denote by UDipRiq Ď Si the set of strategies of agent i that
are not weakly dominated given Ri. For any R “ pR1, R2, . . . , Rnq P R
n, we define
UD´ipR´iq ”
Ś
j‰i UDjpRjq for every i P I.
Theorem 1. Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set Ri Ď R such that
Ui “
Ť
RiPRi
UpRiq, and suppose Mi “ ∆pU´iq for all i P I. Then a mechanism is
strategically simple with respect to U and M if and only if for every R P
Ś
iPI Ri there
is an agent i˚ P I such that for every strategy si˚ P UDi˚pRi˚q there is an alternative
a P A such that:
gpsi˚, s´i˚q “ a for all s´i˚ P UD´i˚pR´i˚q.
In words, the condition that is necessary and sufficient for strategically simple mech-
anisms says the following. Whenever we fix a vector of preferences pR1, R2, . . . , Rnq PŚ
iPI Ri and consider the mechanism restricted to the strategy sets UDipRiq for all
i P I, then, in the restricted mechanism, some agent i˚ is a dictator. That is, for each
of the alternatives that are possible when agents choose their strategies from UDipRiq,
agent i˚ has a strategy that enforces that alternative if all other agents choose from
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UDipRiq, and each of agent i
˚’s strategies enforces some alternative. We call agent i˚
a “local dictator,” because in the restricted game agent i˚ dictates which alternative
is chosen.
The theorem applies only to certain domains of utility functions and beliefs. Specif-
ically, the theorem assumes that for each agent the set of relevant utility functions is
the set of all utility functions that induce some preference from a given set of prefer-
ences, and that for each agent the relevant beliefs are all beliefs that have support in
the set of considered utility functions. We thus allow restricted domains of strategic
simplicity, but domains that still satisfy strong “richness” conditions. In some set-
tings, such as voting settings, these assumptions may be plausible, whereas in other
settings, they may be less desirable. For example, when the allocation of money is
part of the specification of alternatives, our assumption on the set of utility functions
rules out that only risk neutral agents are considered, even though that is a popular
case in the mechanism design literature. The assumption on the set of relevant be-
liefs rules out that each agent regards the other agents’ preferences as stochastically
independent. Our proof of Theorem 1 makes strong use of these assumptions, and
we have not yet found useful results for smaller domains.
Theorem 1 characterizes strategically simple mechanisms in terms of the local dic-
tatorship property. The local dictatorship property is useful in several aspects. First,
it provides a powerful tool to check whether a given mechanism is strategically simple.
Second, the local dictatorship property can be used to establish several further prop-
erties of strategically simple mechanisms. These properties are contained in Appendix
C. Third, we use the local dictatorship property to further study strategically simple
mechanisms in two applications. In the bilateral trade environment that we study in
Section 5, we fully characterize the class of all strategically simple mechanisms. In
the voting environment that we study in Section 6, we fully characterize the class
of all strategically simple mechanisms when there are two agents and three alterna-
tives. All these results build on the local dictatorship property that we established
in Theorem 1.
Furthermore, the local dictatorship property implies that certain outcome corre-
spondences cannot be associated with any strategically simple mechanism. Loosely
speaking, the set of alternatives can depend on at most one agent’s vNM utilities and
utility beliefs when we hold a preference profile R fixed. We formalize this property
in the following definition. We say that a profile of utility functions u´i induces a
profile of preference relations R´i if for every j P Iztiu, uj induces Rj, and that a
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profile of utility functions u induces a profile of preference relations R if for every
i P I, ui induces Ri.
Definition 6. Let i P I and R P Rn. An outcome correspondence F : U ˆM ։ A
is “non-responsive to the vNM utilities and utility beliefs of agents j ‰ i at R” if,
whenever ui P Ui induces Ri, u´i, uˆ´i P U´i both induce R´i, µi PMi, and µ´i, µˆ´i P
M´i, then:
F ppui, u´iq, pµi, µ´iqq “ F ppui, uˆ´iq, pµi, µˆ´iqq.
In words, the outcome correspondence is non-responsive to agents j ‰ i at R if, as
long as agents’ utility functions represent the preferences in R, then the von Neumann
Morgenstern utility functions and beliefs of agents j ‰ i have no impact on the set
of outcomes. The following result follows directly from Theorem 1. We don’t give a
formal proof.
Corollary 1. Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set Ri Ď R such that
Ui “
Ť
RiPRi
UpRiq, and suppose Mi “ ∆pU´iq for all i P I. If an outcome corre-
spondence F : U ˆM ։ A can be associated with a mechanism that is strategically
simple, then for every preference profile R P Rn there is some agent i˚ such that the
correspondence F is non-responsive to the vNM utilities and utility beliefs of agents
j ‰ i˚ at R.
Agent i˚ in this corollary is obviously the local dictator at R. This corollary implies,
for example, that it is impossible to find a strategically simple mechanism that on
its whole domain implements alternatives that maximize ex post utilitarian welfare,
that is, the sum of agents’ utilities.
Before we move on to the applications, we now partition the set of all strategically
simple mechanisms on domains that satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 1 into two
subsets. This provides a further understanding of strategically simple mechanisms. If
the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold, then, for any R P R1ˆR2ˆ . . .ˆRn, we denote
by I˚pRq the set of local dictators at R.
Definition 7. Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set Ri Ď R such that
Ui “
Ť
RiPRi
UpRiq, and suppose Mi “ ∆pU´iq for all i P I. Then a strategically
simple mechanism with respect to U and M is of “type 1” if:
č
RP
Ś
iPI
Ri
I˚pRq ‰ H.
Otherwise, it is of “type 2.”
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In words, in a type 1 strategically simple mechanism, there is an agent who is local
dictator at all preference profiles, whereas this is not the case for type 2 strategically
simple mechanisms.
Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms can be easily characterized. To state this
characterization, we first introduce a class of mechanisms that we call “delegation
mechanisms.”
Definition 8. A mechanism is a “delegation mechanism” if it is the reduced normal
form of an extensive form mechanism of the following type: First, some agent i˚ P I
chooses an element si˚ from some finite set Si˚. All agents observe si˚. Then, for
every si˚, a subgame with simultaneous moves follows in which the players are the
agents in Izti˚u, and in which a dominant strategy mechanism with outcomes in A is
played, where the mechanism may depend on si˚.
In a delegation mechanism, the mechanism designer delegates the choice of the
mechanism to some agent i˚. This agent has to choose a mechanism from a given set of
dominant strategy mechanisms that the mechanism designer has specified. Clearly, in
a delegation mechanism, all agents except i˚ have dominant strategies, and therefore
do not even have to form first-order beliefs, and for agent i˚ therefore only first-order
belief is relevant to the optimal choice. It is worth noting that dominant strategy
mechanisms, in which all agents, for all relevant utility functions, have dominant
strategies, are trivially delegation mechanisms.
Theorem 2. Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set Ri Ď R such that
Ui “
Ť
RiPRi
UpRiq, and suppose Mi “ ∆pU´iq for all i P I.
(1) Every delegation mechanism is a type 1 strategically simple mechanism.
(2) For every type 1 strategically simple mechanism, there is an equivalent dele-
gation mechanism.
We do not have a parallel result for type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in the
general framework. But we shall present a characterization of type 2 strategically
simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment that we study in the next
section, and also a characterization of type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in the
voting problem in Section 6 when there are 2 agents and 3 alternatives.
5. Bilateral Trade
We first consider an example of an environment in which outcomes include money
payments, and in which it is therefore natural to restrict attention to preferences
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that are monotonically increasing in money, and to beliefs that attach probability
1 to preferences that are monotonically increasing in money. The set of agents is:
I “ tS,Bu, where S is the seller, and B is the buyer. The set of outcomes is:
A “ tφu Y T , where “φ” stands for “no trade,” and T is a finite subset of R``. An
outcome t P T corresponds to trade at price t. We require trade to be voluntary. We
refer to any mechanism for this setting as a “bilateral trade mechanism” if each agent
has a strategy that enforces the no trade outcome.
The preferences RS over A that we consider for the seller are indexed by some
value vS ą 0, and the preferences RB over A that we consider for the buyer are
indexed by some value vB ą 0. We assume that for i “ S,B the set of possible
values of vi is a finite subset Vi of R`` with the following properties: minVi ă minT ,
maxVi ą maxT , and Vi X T “ H for i “ S,B. The preference with index vS is such
that the seller prefers outcome φ to outcome t if and only if t ă vS, and the seller
prefers larger elements of T to smaller ones. The preference with index vB is such
that the buyer prefers outcome φ to outcome t if and only if t ą vB, and the buyer
prefers smaller elements of T to larger ones.
In the notation of Section 4, we have now specified the sets Ri for i “ S,B. The
sets of admissible utility functions Ui and admissible beliefs Mi are as given in the
first sentence of Theorem 1. Note that the model that we have described does not
assume quasi-linear preferences. Rather, arbitrary risk attitudes are allowed.
Theorem 2 implies the following characterization of type 1 strategically simple
bilateral trade mechanisms:
Proposition 1. A bilateral trade mechanism is type 1 strategically simple if and only
if it is equivalent to the normalform of a mechanism of the following type: Agents
play a two-stage game of perfect information.
1. Agent i˚ either chooses a price t from some finite set Tˆ Ď T , or chooses to
reject trade. If agent i˚ rejects trade, then the game ends. No trade takes
place, and no transfers are paid. Otherwise, Stage 2 is entered.
2. Agent ´i˚ accepts or rejects trade at the price t proposed by agent i˚. If
agent ´i˚ accepts, then trade takes place, and the buyer pays the seller price
t. Otherwise, no trade takes place, and no transfers are paid.
To obtain the class of mechanisms described in Proposition 1, consider the following
simple argument. When there are only two agents, the second-stage dominant strat-
egy mechanisms as referred to in Theorem 2 are single agent mechanisms in which the
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agent ´i˚ chooses among alternatives offered by agent i˚. Among the options offered
that do include trade, the seller, if she is agent ´i˚, will always pick trade at the
highest price, and the buyer, if he is agent ´i˚, will always pick trade at the lowest
price. Therefore, offering trade at more than one price is redundant. Moreover, the
mechanism that the seller offers must always include the no trade option.
Proposition 1 in fact provides a complete characterization of all bilateral trade
mechanisms that are strategically simple, as the following result, which we prove in
Appendix D, shows:
Proposition 2. There are no bilateral trade mechanisms that are type 2 strategically
simple.
Strategically simple mechanisms are more flexible than dominant strategy mecha-
nisms in the bilateral trade environment. It is known that the only dominant strategy
mechanisms that satisfy ex post budget balance and individual rationality are posted
price mechanisms. As discussed in the Introduction, for each posted price mechanism,
there exists a corresponding type 1 strategically simple bilateral trade mechanism (the
price cap mechanism) that facilitates more efficient trade.
6. Voting
We now analyze strategically simple mechanisms in settings in which no restrictions
are assumed regarding the agents’ utilities or beliefs: Ui “ U and Mi “ ∆pU
n´1q for
all i P I. Note that this is the most demanding form of strategic simplicity. We call a
mechanism that is strategically simple on this domain a “strategically simple voting
mechanism,” because the unrestricted domain is a domain that has been considered in
parts of the voting literature. The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [15, 24]
shows that in the voting environment, a mechanism has dominant strategies if and
only if it is dictatorial. As we shall see, there are many more strategically simple
voting mechanisms.
The voting environment satisfies the domain assumptions in Section 4. Thus, The-
orems 1 and 2 can be applied. We shall now distinguish type 1 and type 2 strategically
simple voting mechanisms. In a type 1 strategically simple voting mechanism, some
agent i˚ chooses a subset of the set A of alternatives and a dominant strategy mech-
anism for the other agents to pick one alternative from this set. In a second stage,
the other agents then play this dominant strategy mechanism. The influence of the
first agent on the ultimate outcome may be restricted by limiting the set of subsets
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of A and dominant strategy mechanisms she can choose from. If she can choose any
arbitrary subset, then, of course, we have the classical dictatorship.
Standard results in voting theory provide characterizations of dominant strategy
mechanisms that can be played in the second stage. If agent i˚ rules out all but two
alternatives, then a mechanism has dominant strategies if and only if it is a generalized
form of majority voting (see Barbera` [3, p. 759]). If agent i˚ allows the other agents to
pick from at least three alternatives, then it follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem that only dictatorial mechanisms have dominant strategies. Thus, agent i˚,
if she wants to allow at least three alternatives, has to pick one of the other agents,
and needs to let this agent make the ultimate decision, where this agent is restricted
to the set of alternatives chosen by agent i˚.
Type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms are harder to characterize. Here,
we provide a characterization for the voting environment with two agents and three
alternatives, but leave as an open question the full characterization for more general
voting environments.
Proposition 3. Let #A “ 3 and n “ 2. A voting mechanism is type 2 strategically
simple if and only if it is one of the following two mechanisms (up to relabeling of the
agents and the alternatives):
a b` b´ c` c´
a a a a a a
b` a b b a b
b´ a b b c b
c` a a c c c
c´ a b b c c
a b c` c´
a a a a a
b` a b a b
b´ a b c b
c a b c c
Mechanism A Mechanism B
The second mechanism in Proposition 3 has already appeared in Section 3 as an
illustration of the notion of strategic simplicity (although the strategies were labeled
differently there). Here, we give a more extensive discussion of the first mechanism,
and then add some brief comments about the second mechanism. For simplicity, let
us call the first mechanism “mechanism A” and the second mechanism “mechanism
B.”
Interpretation of Mechanism A: This mechanism has the following interpre-
tation (which also motivates the labels that we have given to the strategies). Each
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agent has five strategies: a vote for a, a “strong vote” for b denoted by b`, a “weak
vote” for b denoted by b´, and similarly a “strong vote” and a “weak vote” for c,
denoted by c` and c´ respectively. Alternative a is the default alternative. If at
least one of the agents votes for the default, then the default is chosen. If both agents
vote for b (resp. c), then b (resp. c) is chosen regardless of whether the votes are
strong or weak. If one of the agents casts a strong vote for b, but the other agent
only casts a weak vote for c, then b is chosen. Similarly, if one agent casts a strong
vote for c, but the other agent only casts a weak vote for b, then c is chosen. If the
agents cast weak votes for different alternatives, the disagreement is resolved in favor
of b. If the agents cast strong votes for different alternatives, the mechanism reverts
to the default a.
Voting Incentives in Mechanism A: Let us verify that this mechanism is strate-
gically simple. Agents who rank a top have a dominant strategy to vote for a. Let us
say that an agent i has “a weak preference for b over c” if her preference is: bRicRia.
That is, she ranks the default a below both b and c. For such an agent, a weak vote
for b is weakly dominant. Similarly, for an agent who has a “strong preference for b
over c,” i.e., cRibRia, a strong vote for b is weakly dominant.
Weak and strong preferences for c over b are analogously defined, and it is also
clear that an agent with a strong preference for c over b has the weakly dominant
strategy of voting strongly for c. The final case to consider is an agent who has a
weak preference for c over b. Such an agent has two undominated strategies: a “weak”
or a “strong” vote for c. Informally, such an agent potentially has an incentive to
“overstate” the strength of her preference. The reason is as follows. A weak vote for
c will inevitably lead to b if the other agent votes for b. If a strong vote for c is cast,
then the outcome is a, which is worse than b, if the other agent casts a strong vote for
b, and the outcome is c, which is better than b, if the other agent casts a weak vote
for b. Which of these two cases is more important depends on the utility difference
between c and b, and on the agent’s belief about the relative likelihood of the other
agent having a weak or strong preference for b over c.
Notice that in no case higher-order beliefs matter for an agent’s choice. This is
obvious if an agent has a weakly dominant choice. For agents with a weak preference
for c over b, higher-order beliefs don’t matter because, whether the other agent casts
a weak or strong vote for b does not depend on that agent’s first-order beliefs. Thus,
the mechanism is strategically simple.
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Normative Properties of Mechanism A: Why might a mechanism designer
find mechanism A attractive? The most obvious attractive feature of mechanism A is
that it is anonymous, that is, it treats all agents equally. Anonymity is often regarded
by itself as a desirable property of a voting mechanism. No type 1 strategically simple
mechanism, and in particular no dominant strategy mechanism, is anonymous in the
voting setting with 2 agents and 3 alternatives.
The mechanism may also appeal to a mechanism designer who maximizes expected
welfare. To show this, we consider two welfare criteria: the sum of agents’ utilities
(“utilitarian welfare”) and the minimum of agents’ utilities (“Rawlsian welfare”), and
we consider the comparison between mechanism A and dictatorship. Under mech-
anism A, when both agents rank a in the middle, but rank different outcomes top,
outcome a is chosen, and thus agents “compromise.” This yields higher Rawlsian
welfare than dictatorship, and it might also yield higher utilitarian welfare than dic-
tatorship, depending on the agents’ vNM utilities of the compromise. When one agent
ranks c top, and the other agent ranks c second behind b, then c is chosen, regardless
of which agent ranks c top, whereas under dictatorship c is only chosen when the first
agent is the dictator. If the second agent is the dictator, then mechanism A yields
higher utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare.
On the other hand, mechanism A might also lead to a Pareto inefficiency. Pareto
inefficiencies harm both utilitarian welfare and Rawlsian welfare, and they are not
possible under dictatorship. A Pareto inefficiency occurs if one agent has a weak
preference for c over b and the other agent has a strong preference for b over c.
Agents may end up with a, although both prefer b to a. This happens if the agent
with a weak preference for c over b exaggerates the strength of her preference and
casts a strong vote for c. But she will do so only if the utility from b is close to zero,
and therefore the loss from getting a rather than b is “small.”
To compare mechanism A and dictatorship, the designer might adopt an ex ante
perspective and calculate the expected welfare if she has a prior over all utility func-
tions and all first-order beliefs. It is clear from the analysis in the previous two
paragraphs that depending on which prior the designer uses, she may prefer one
mechanism or the other. Under the uniform distribution over all utility functions
and all first-order beliefs, mechanism A achieves higher expected welfare than the
dictatorial mechanism under both welfare criteria, as one can check numerically.
Mechanism B: This mechanism is similar to mechanism A, but it is not anony-
mous. In mechanism B, only agent 1 can differentiate between a weak or a strong vote
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for b, and only agent 2 can differentiate between a weak or a strong vote for c. The
voting rules are then similar to the voting rules in mechanism A. In this mechanism,
as the analysis in Section 3 showed, agent 1 has two undominated strategies when
she has a “strong” preference for c over b, i.e. cRiaRib: voting for c and voting for
a. This reflects that she cannot cast a “strong” vote for c, unlike in mechanism A.
Agent 2 has two undominated strategies when she has a weak preference for c over b.
As in mechanism A, she might cast a “weak” or a “strong” vote for c in this case.
Remark 4. So far in the voting problem, we have considered the domain in which
there is no restriction regarding the agents’ utilities or beliefs: Ui “ U and Mi “
∆pUn´1q for all i P I. A common domain restriction for preferences in the voting
literature is the so-called single-peaked domain. In our context, a single-peaked domain
would be one for which there is an ordering of the alternatives in A so that for all i
all utility functions in Ui are single-peaked, and the set Mi is the set of all beliefs that
assign probability 1 to single-peaked utility functions. It is easy to see that the first
mechanism in Proposition 3 is type 2 strategically simple even in the single-peaked
domain when the alternatives are arranged in alphabetical order, whereas the second
mechanism is type 1 strategically simple on the single-peaked domain.
7. Related Literature
Li [20] proposes the concept of “obviously strategy-proof mechanisms.” These
mechanisms form a subclass of dominant strategy mechanisms in which it is partic-
ularly easy for agents to recognize that they have a dominant strategy. While Li’s
work is, in spirit, related to ours, our purpose is to introduce a class of mechanisms
that is larger (rather than smaller) than the class of dominant strategy mechanisms,
yet consists only of “simple” mechanisms. Our motivation for this is that in many
applications the set of dominant strategy mechanisms seems “too small.”
Li starts with the observation that subjects in experiments often do not recognize
dominant strategies, but that they do recognize such strategies if the mechanism is
“obviously strategy-proof.” But if subjects in experiments don’t even recognize what
is not obvious, readers might ask, then how can we expect them to engage in the
strategic reasoning that we have called “strategically simple” in this paper?
We think that Li captures a different dimension of “simplicity” than we do. In dom-
inant strategy mechanisms, and arguably also in strategically simple mechanisms, the
“logic” that underlies the determination of an optimal strategy is straightforward. By
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this we mean that the logic can be explained to the agents in a simple and persua-
sive way. This is presumably a necessary, but not sufficient condition for optimal
choices to be “obvious” in the sense that agents can easily find optimal strategies by
themselves, without being offered explanations. In practice, it seems common that
mechanism designers spend a lot of time explaining to the participants in the mech-
anism how the mechanism works, and which considerations the participants should
base their strategic choices on. We regard our requirement of strategic simplicity as
a formalization of the idea that the mechanism designer can present a simple and
persuasive explanation of the relevant strategic considerations to the agents. That
does not mean that the optimal choices are “obvious” to the agents.
Several recent papers have analyzed mechanism design when agents’ strategy choices
are guided by “level-k thinking.”10 Like our paper, the level-k model of strategic
choice is motivated by the idea that there is bound to the length of hierarchies of be-
liefs that agents can form. We assume in this paper that k is equal to 2. The level-k
model relies, however, on an exogenously assumed “anchor” that describes the beliefs
of an agent who does not analyze the other agents’ incentives at all, but who does
maximize expected utility (“level 1 agents”). This amounts to selecting among the
not strictly dominated strategies of level 1 agents those that are best responses to a
particular belief. We select the not weakly dominated strategies, and thus implicitly
assume full support beliefs, but do not fix any specific anchor belief. Thus, our theory
of behavior is in most games more permissive than the level-k model of behavior.
Particularly closely related to our work is a paper by de Clippel et al. [14]. They
consider an incomplete information environment with a common prior type space.
The mechanism designer seeks to implement a social choice function that assigns to
each type vector one outcome. They study a mechanism designer who believes that
each agent i is a level kipě 1q player, but who does not know the levels ki. Implemen-
tation is achieved if for each type vector the desired outcome results whenever each
player i is a level ki player for any combination of ki’s. This implies that players with
a level ki ě 2 anticipate the same outcome regardless of which level the other players
are, and therefore that there is no benefit to a player of thinking beyond level 2, just
as in our paper. However, unlike our paper, de Clippel et al.’s postulate an exogenous
anchor, work with common priors, and focus on social choice functions rather than
correspondences.
10De Clippel et al. [14], Crawford [11], Gorelkina [16], Kneeland [19].
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Our work is also related to papers that consider the implementation of social choice
functions when agents perform a limited number of rounds of elimination of dominated
strategies. Saran’s [23] implementation notion includes the requirement that any
strategy combination that survives one round of elimination of strictly undominated
strategies yields the outcome prescribed by the social choice function. He obtains
for many economic environments that a strict subset of the set of all strategy-proof
social choice functions can be implemented. By comparison, in our model agents are
assumed to be able to perform higher-order strategic thinking. Another difference is
that we allow for the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Jackson et al. [18] and Sjo¨stro¨m [25] show that, in certain economic environments,
all social choice functions can be implemented in two rounds of elimination of weakly
dominated strategies, with a unique strategy surviving in round two. Thus, the
corresponding mechanisms are strategically simple on the restricted domain in which
agents have point beliefs about the other agents’ preferences. This paper considers
strategic simplicity on larger domains.
In complete information models, de Clippel et al. [13] and Van der Linden [26] use
the number of rounds of elimination of dominated strategies, or of backward induction,
that are required to solve a mechanism as a measure of the strategic complexity of
mechanisms for the choice of an arbitrator or of a jury. This idea is closely related
to our notion of strategic simplicity. One important difference with our work is that
they don’t allow uncertainty about other agents’ preferences.
Bahel and Sprumont [2] consider dominant strategy mechanisms for the choice
among Savage acts. The act that is chosen by the mechanism may depend on each
agents’ beliefs about the state, but it will not depend on any agent’s beliefs about the
other agents’ beliefs about the state, etc. This is because, for given beliefs and valu-
ations, their mechanisms have dominant strategies. There is thus a parallel between
their work and ours, although in their work beliefs are about Savage-style “states of
the world,” whereas in our work beliefs are about other agents’ preferences.
Strategic simplicity can also be interpreted as a form of robustness in the sense of
Bergemann and Morris [4]. Whereas Bergemann and Morris study implementation
that does not rely on any conditions on agents’ hierarchies of beliefs, we study imple-
mentation of outcomes that may depend on agents’ first layer of beliefs, but not on
any higher-order beliefs.
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8. Discussion
In this section, we suggest some directions for further research. First, it might
be interesting to define a refinement of strategic simplicity that is satisfied by all
mechanisms that we call “type 1 strategically simple,” but not by any mechanism
that we call “type 2 strategically simple.” Type 2 strategically simple mechanisms
don’t just seem harder to characterize. The type 2 strategically simple mechanisms
that we have found in the voting environment also seem more complicated for the
agents than the delegation mechanisms.11
To find such a refinement, one would have to look for an intermediate notion of
simplicity that is weaker than the requirement that agents have dominant strategies
but stronger than the requirement that the mechanism be strategically simple in
our sense. One way of proceeding would be the following. Say that a mechanism
is “strategically simple˚” if each agent believes their opponents choose a dominant
strategy if there is one, but she does not have any idea how the other agents choose
their strategies if there is no dominant strategy. In particular, she may even consider it
plausible that they choose dominated strategies if there is no dominant strategy. Note
that this alternative notion lowers each agent’s belief in the other agents’ rationality
in comparison to our construction. This alternative assumption enlarges the set
of compatible strategic beliefs and thus makes it harder for each agent to have an
action that is always a best response to all these compatible strategic beliefs. This
does not affect the type 1 strategically simple mechanisms that we study, because
the agents who have dominant strategies still do not have to think about the other
agents’ beliefs, and the only agent who does not have dominant strategies believes
that the other agents play the dominant strategy. However, this would rule out type
2 strategically simple mechanisms as “strategically simple˚” mechanisms, because in
type 2 strategically simple mechanisms, there are at least two agents who do not have
a dominant strategy, and each of these two agents does not believe the other agent
only picks undominated strategies.
The construction described in the previous paragraph is, however, a bit ad-hoc.
Thus the open research question is whether there are other ways of strengthening the
requirement of strategic simplicity that rule out type 2 strategically simple mecha-
nisms, but not type 1 strategically simple mechanisms. Another interesting research
direction on type 2 strategically simple mechanisms would be to seek general condi-
tions on primitives that imply that all strategically simple mechanisms are of type 1.
11We thank the editor and the referees for encouraging us to think along this direction.
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We provided one such environment in this paper, namely, the bilateral trade environ-
ment. Our proof in the bilateral trade environment relies heavily on the particular
domain structure, and we have not yet found useful ways to generalize the result to
other settings.
Strategic simplicity as defined in this paper focuses on mechanisms in which the
agents’ optimal choices can be based on first-order beliefs alone. It would be inter-
esting to investigate mechanisms in which there is some integer k ě 2 such that only
beliefs up to the kth-order matter for agents’ choices. Our experience from writing
this paper suggests that a characterization of such mechanisms might be particularly
difficult when considering the analog of what we have called in this paper “type 2”
strategically simple mechanisms. However, even the generalization of type 1 strategi-
cally mechanism seems non-trivial. Consider the following simple example: There are
three agents that vote over four alternatives. The three agents in turn remove one al-
ternative from consideration, and the remaining alternative is chosen. This is a simple
extension of type 1 strategically simple voting mechanisms, and one might conjecture
that the highest order beliefs that matter for optimal choice in this mechanism are
the second-order beliefs. Obviously, the agent who moves last does not have to form
any beliefs. One might conjecture that the agent who moves second only has to form
first-order belief, and that the agent who moves first only has to form second-order
belief. However, this conjecture is wrong. The reason is that the second mover needs
to form second-order belief about the correlation between the first mover’s belief and
the third mover’s preference, and therefore, for the first mover, it matters what he
believes about the second-order belief of the second mover. We have not yet tackled
the complex issues raised by this example, but hope to do so in future research.
A study of strategically simple mechanisms in applications other than the two
settings covered in this paper would be interesting. For certain classes of environ-
ments with quasi-linear preferences, mechanisms in which agents need to form at most
first-order beliefs to determine their expected utility maximizing strategies have been
described in Chen and Li [10], Yamashita and Zhu [28], and Cre´mer and Riordan
[12]. The first two papers show that such strategically simple mechanisms dominate
the optimal dominant strategy mechanism for a revenue maximizing mechanism de-
signer, and Cre´mer and Riordan [12] focus on efficiency properties. While strategic
simplicity is not the focus of these papers, their results suggest that a further study
of strategically simple mechanisms in environments with quasi-linear preferences (for
example, strategically simple auctions) might be promising.
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Future research might also develop criteria which a mechanism designer could use
to evaluate strategically simple mechanisms, and then characterize using such criteria
the best strategically simple mechanisms. The simplest way of proceeding would
be to endow the mechanism designer with a prior over agents’ utility functions and
their first-order beliefs, and then to maximize the expected value of the designer’s
objective function. In this paper we have conducted such an exercise when comparing
the expected welfare from a type 2 strategically simple voting mechanism and a
dictatorial voting mechanism. The comparison is based on a uniform prior. An
interesting open research question is whether in the voting context, and in general,
results can be obtained that do not rely on the ad-hoc specification of a prior.
Finally, experimental tests of our notion of strategic simplicity would be of interest.
We argued in the previous section that in strategically simple mechanisms the “logic”
that underlies the determination of an optimal strategy is straightforward, although
it might not be obvious. To address the possibility that experimental subjects might
not discover by themselves what is not obvious, the experimenter might explain it
to them. A test of our concept of strategic simplicity could potentially rely on a
comparison between the subjects’ understanding and acceptance of the experimenter’s
explanations in strategically simple mechanisms, and in mechanisms that are not
strategically simple.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
We first show that mechanisms that satisfy the conditions in the theorem are strate-
gically simple. Fix an agent i P I, any utility function ui P Ui, and any utility belief
µi P Mi. We have to show that agent i has a strategy that is a best response to all
compatible strategic beliefs.
Let Ri denote the preference induced by ui. It suffices to show that there is a
strategy in UDipRiq that is among the strategies in UDipRiq a best response to all
compatible strategic beliefs. By the definition of weak dominance given Ri, the same
strategy will then also be among all strategies of agent i a best response to all com-
patible strategic beliefs.
We can classify the profiles of utility functions u´i of agents other than i into two
categories: (1) the ones that induce preference profile R´i such that agent i is a
local dictator in the mechanism restricted to the strategy set UDipRiq for agent i and
strategy sets UD´ipR´iq for the other agents; and (2) the ones that induce preference
profile R´i such that agent i is not a local dictator in this mechanism. In the first
case, the outcome is determined by agent i’s own choice from UDipRiq regardless of
which strategies in UDpR´iq the other agents choose, and with utility function u´i
all undominated strategies of the other agents will be contained in UD´ipR´iq. In
the second case, the outcome is the same regardless of agent i’s own choice from
UDipRiq as long as the other agents choose strategies in UD´ipR´iq, and, again, with
utility function u´i all undominated strategies of the other agents will be contained
in UD´ipR´iq. Thus, agent i’s expected utility maximizing choice from UDipRiq only
depends on her utility belief, and is the same for all compatible strategic beliefs, and
we can conclude that the mechanism is strategically simple.
Next, we show that mechanisms that are strategically simple with respect to do-
mains described in the theorem must satisfy the conditions in the theorem. We
proceed by establishing a sequence of claims.
Claim A.1. Let ui P Ui, u´i P U´i, and let µi P Mi be a utility belief such
that µiptu´iuq ą 0. Suppose si, s
1
i P
Ş
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq. Then for all s´i, s
1
´i P
UD´ipu´iq:
uipgpsi, s´iqq ´ uipgps
1
i, s´iqq “ uipgpsi, s
1
´iqq ´ uipgps
1
i, s
1
´iqq.
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Proof. Suppose the assertion were not true. Then there are s´i, s
1
´i P UD´ipu´iq such
that:
uipgpsi, s´iqq ´ uipgps
1
i, s´iqq ą uipgpsi, s
1
´iqq ´ uipgps
1
i, s
1
´iqq.
Pick any µˆi PMipµiq that places strictly positive probability on s´i and s
1
´i. Because
si and s
1
i are both in BRipui, µˆiq both strategies must yield the same expected utility
under µˆi. Now suppose we vary µˆi such that it places ε probability more than µˆi on
s´i and ε probability less than µˆi on s
1
´i, leaving all other probabilities unchanged. If
we choose ε ą 0 and sufficiently small, we can vary µˆi in this way so that it remains an
element of Mipµiq, and so that for the modified belief si is a strictly better response
than s1i. This contradicts s
1
i P
Ş
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq. 
Claim A.2. Let ui P Ui, u´i P U´i, and let µi, µ
1
i P Mi be any two utility beliefs
such that µiptu´iuq ą 0 and µ
1
iptu´iuq ą 0. Suppose:
si P
č
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq;
and s1i P
č
µˆ1
i
PMipµ1iq
BRipui, µˆ
1
iq.
Then for all s´i, s
1
´i P UD´ipu´iq:
uipgpsi, s´iqq ´ uipgps
1
i, s´iqq “ uipgpsi, s
1
´iqq ´ uipgps
1
i, s
1
´iqq.
Proof. We focus on the non-trivial case: si ‰ s
1
i. Claim A.2 follows from repeated
applications of Claim A.1 if we can find a sequence of utility beliefs of agent i, µki
(k “ 2, . . . , K), and strategies of agent i, ski (k “ 1, 2, . . . , K), where K ě 2, such
that s1i “ si, s
K
i “ s
1
i, for every k P t2, . . . , Ku the utility belief µ
k
i places positive
probability on u´i, and for every k P t2, . . . , Ku both s
k´1
i and s
k
i are elements ofŞ
µˆk
i
PMipµki q
BRipui, µˆ
k
i q. We shall construct such a sequence.
For every α P r0, 1s we define µipαq ” p1´αqµi`αµ
1
i. We set s
1
i “ si. Define α
2 ”
suptα P r0, 1s|s1i P
Ş
µˆiPMipµipαqq
BRipui, µˆiqu. Observe that the upper hemi-continuity
of the best response correspondence implies that s1i P
Ş
µˆiPMipµipα2qq
BRipui, µˆiqu. If
α2 “ 1, then we can set s2i “ s
1
i, µ
2
i “ µ
1
i, K “ 2, and our sequence has all the required
properties.
If α2 ă 1, define s2i to be any strategy in Si that is an element of:č
µˆiPMipµipα2`εqq
BRipui, µˆiqu
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for a sequence of ε ą 0 tending to zero. Then, by upper hemi-continuity of the
correspondence of best responses, s2i P
Ş
µˆiPMipµipα2qq
BRipui, µˆiqu. We define µ
2
i to
be µipα
2q. Note that, because µi and µ
1
i attach strictly positive probability to u´i,
and because µ2i is a convex combination of µi and µ
1
i, also µ
2
i places strictly positive
probability on u´i. If s
2
i “ s
1
i, then we set K “ 2, and the construction is complete.
If s2i ‰ s
1
i, then we repeat the steps just described. In general, let k ě 2, and suppose
that, after k´ 1 steps, we had determined µki such that µ
k
i “ µipα
kq for some αk ă 1,
and ski such that s
k
i ‰ s
1
i. Then repeating the steps described above means that we
define αk`1 ” suptα P rαk, 1s|ski P
Ş
µˆiPMipµipαqq
BRipui, µˆiqu. By the upper hemi-
continuity of the best response correspondence: ski P
Ş
µˆiPMipµipαk`1qq
BRipui, µˆiqu. If
αk`1 “ 1, then we can define sk`1i “ s
1
i, µ
k`1
i “ µ
1
i, K “ k ` 1, and our sequence
has the required properties. If αk`1 ă 1, define sk`1i to be a strategy in Si that
is an element of
Ş
µˆiPMipµipαk`1`εqq
BRipui, µˆiqu for a sequence of ε ą 0 tending to
zero. By the upper hemi-continuity of the correspondence of best responses, sk`1i PŞ
µˆiPMipµipαk`1qq
BRipui, µˆiqu. We define µ
k`1
i to be µipα
k`1q. Note that µk`1i places
strictly positive probability on u´i. If s
k`1
i “ s
1
i, then we set K “ k ` 1, and the
construction is complete. Otherwise, we continue as before.
Note that by construction, in the sequence of strategies no strategy is ever repeated.
Because the number of strategies is finite, the construction has to end after a finite
number of steps. At that point our sequence will have all the required properties. 
Claim A.3. For every agent i, for every preference Ri P Ri on A, there exists a
utility function u˚i that represents Ri, such that for every si P UDipRiq there is a
strategic belief µˆi with support equal to S´i such that:
BRipu
˚
i , µˆiq “ tsiu.
Moreover, the utility function u˚i can be chosen such that u
˚
i paq´u
˚
i pbq ‰ u
˚
i pcq´u
˚
i pdq
for all pa, bq, pc, dq P A2 with pa, bq ‰ pc, dq.
Proof. First note that, if we can find a utility function u˚i with the property in the
first sentence of Claim A.3, then we can slightly perturb this utility function so that
the property in the first sentence is maintained, but also the condition in the second
sentence of Claim A.3 holds. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove only the first sentence
of Claim A.3.
By the Lemma, and the remark in the first paragraph of the proof of that Lemma,
in Bo¨rgers [6], for every strategy si P UDipRiq there exist a utility function usi that
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represents Ri, and a full support strategic belief µˆi, such that si is the unique max-
imizer of expected utility given that belief. To prove Claim A.3 it therefore only
remains to be shown that the utility functions usi can be chosen to be the same for
all strategies si P UDipRiq.
We begin with the following observation: Suppose that si is the unique maximizer
of expected utility in Si for utility function ui and full support strategic belief µˆi,
and suppose that f : R Ñ R is strictly increasing and concave. We claim that then
there is another full support strategic belief ˆˆµi such that si is the unique maximizer
of expected utility for the utility function f ˝ ui. To see this note first that, because
si maximizes expected utility for a full support belief if utility is ui, it is not weakly
dominated given utility function ui. Next, because f is increasing and concave, si
is not weakly dominated given utility function f ˝ ui, either. This follows directly
from the argument in the proof of Proposition 1 in Weinstein [27]. We can now use
Lemma 4 in Pearce [22] and conclude that there is some full support strategic belief
ˆˆµi of agent i such that si maximizes expected utility when the utility function is
f ˝ui. It remains to be shown that this belief can be chosen such that si is the unique
maximizer of expected utility. We do this in the next paragraph.
Because si is the unique maximizer of expected utility for some full support belief
if the utility function is ui, by Theorem 2.3 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [5], the utility
vector puipsi, s´iqqs´iPS´i P R
|S´i| is an extreme point of the convex hull of the set of
all such utility vectors:
co
´!
puips
1
i, s´iqqs´iPS´i |s
1
i P Si
)¯
.
We now claim that the utility vector corresponding to si remains an extreme point
if we apply an increasing and concave transformation to ui. That is, we claim that
pfpuipsi, s´iqqqs´iPS´i P R
|S´i| is an extreme point of:
co
´!
pfpuips
1
i, s´iqqqs´iPS´i |s
1
i P Si
)¯
.
Suppose it were not. Then pfpuipsi, s´iqqqs´iPS´i could be written as a convex combi-
nation of the elements of
!
pfpuips
1
i, s´iqqqs´iPS´i |s
1
i P Si, s
1
i ‰ si
)
, that is, there would
be a mixed strategy σi P ∆pSiq of agent i that attaches zero probability to si, and
such that:
pfpuipsi, s´iqqqs´iPS´i “
ÿ
s1
i
PSi
pfpuips
1
i, s´iqqqs´iPS´i σips
1
iq.
Because f is strictly concave, this implies:
puipsi, s´iqqs´iPS´i ť puipσi, s´iqqs´iPS´i ,
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which contradicts that si is not weakly dominated for utility function ui. We conclude
that pfpuipsi, s´iqqqs´iPS´i P R
|S´i| is an extreme point. Using again Theorem 2.3 in
Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis [5] this implies that there is some function ξ : S´i Ñ R such
that si is the unique maximizer of
ř
s´iPS´i
ξps´iqfpuipsi, s´iqq in Si. Let us treat ξ as
a vector inR|S´i|. One can verify that there must be a small ball around ξ such that for
every vector ξ˜ in this ball si is the unique maximizer of
ř
s´iPS´i
ξ˜ps´iqfpuipsi, s´iqq.
We can pick from this ball some ξ˜ such that
ř
s´iPS´i
ξ˜ps´iq ‰ 0. Now consider the
vector µ˜i defined by:
µ˜ips´iq ”
ˆˆµi ` ε
ξ˜ps´iqř
s1
´i
PS´i
ξ˜ps1
´i
q
1` ε
for all s´i P S´i. For sufficiently small ε ą 0 this is a strategic belief. It is a convex
combination of ˆˆµi, for which si is a expected utility maximizer, and of ξ˜, for which
si is the unique maximizer of
ř
s´iPS´i
ξ˜ps´iqfpuipsi, s´iqq in Si. Therefore, si is the
unique expected utility maximizer for the strategic belief µ˜i.
We can now complete the proof by showing that there are a utility function u˚i and,
for every si P UDipRiq, a concave function fsi : RÑ R, such that u
˚
i “ fsipusiq for all
si P UDipRiq. We first construct u
˚
i . Enumerate the elements of A as a1, a2, . . . , aL
such that aLRiaL´1RiaL´2Ri . . . Ria1. We pick u
˚
i to satisfy the following, where the
first two lines are a normalization:
u˚i pa1q “ 0
u˚i pa2q “ 1
. . .
u˚i paℓ´1q ă u
˚
i paℓq ă u
˚
i paℓ´1q ` . . .
. . . pu˚i paℓ´1q ´ u
˚
i paℓ´2qq min
siPUDipRiq
usipaℓq ´ usipaℓ´1q
usipaℓ´1q ´ usipaℓ´2q
.
Note that the right most term in the inequality is strictly larger than the left term, so
that u˚i can be constructed, and will be monotonically increasing, and thus compatible
with Ri.
We now turn to the construction of the functions fsi. For every si we set fsipusipaℓqq “
u˚i paℓq for all ℓ “ 1, 2, . . . , L. This defines fsi for a finite number of elements of R only.
However, it is clear that we can extend fsi to a concave piecewise linear function on
R if it satisfies the following concavity condition for the points in which it is defined:
fsipusipaℓqq ´ fsipusipaℓ´1qq
usipaℓq ´ usipaℓ´1q
ď
fsipusipaℓ´1qq ´ fsipusipaℓ´2qq
usipaℓ´1q ´ usipaℓ´2q
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for all ℓ ě 2. By the definition of fsi, this inequality is equivalent to:
u˚i paℓq ´ u
˚
i paℓ´1q
usipaℓq ´ usipaℓ´1q
ď
u˚i paℓ´1q ´ u
˚
i paℓ´2q
usipaℓ´1q ´ usipaℓ´2q
ô
u˚i paℓq ď u
˚
i paℓ´1q ` . . .
. . . pu˚i paℓ´1q ´ u
˚
i paℓ´2qq
usipaℓq ´ usipaℓ´1q
usipaℓ´1q ´ usipaℓ´2q
which holds by construction. 
Claim A.4. For every agent i, for every preference Ri P Ri on A, and for every
u´i P U´i either
(i) there is for every strategy si P UDpRiq an alternative a such that gpsi, s´iq “ a
for all s´i P UD´ipu´iq,
or
(ii) there is for every strategy combination s´i P UD´ipu´iq an alternative a such
that gpsi, s´iq “ a for all si P UDipRiq,
or both.
Proof. Let us represent Ri by the utility function u
˚
i from Claim A.3. Pick any two
si, s
1
i P UDipRiq. By Claim A.3 there are a full support strategic belief µˆi such that:
BRipu
˚
i , µˆiq “ tsiu, and a full support strategic belief µˆ
1
i such that: BRipu
˚
i , µˆ
1
iq “ tsiu.
Because µˆi has full support, and because every strategy is undominated for at least
some utility function, there is a utility belief µi with µipu´iq ą 0 that is compatible
with µˆi. Similarly, there is a utility belief µ
1
i with µ
1
ipu´iq ą 0 that is compatible with
µˆ1i. This implies si P
Ş
µˆiPMipµiq
BRipui, µˆiq and s
1
i P
Ş
µˆ1
i
PMipµ1iq
BRipui, µˆ
1
iq. Therefore,
by Claim A.2 for all s´i, s
1
´i P UD´ipu´iq:
u˚i pgpsi, s´iqq ´ u
˚
i pgps
1
i, s´iqq “ u
˚
i pgpsi, s
1
´iqq ´ u
˚
i pgps
1
i, s
1
´iqq. p˚q
This has to hold for any two si, s
1
i P UDipRiq.
Now let us fix some si P UDipRiq, and suppose first that for some a P A we
have: gpsi, s´iq “ a for all s´i P UD´ipu´iq. Then (*) implies that for every other
s1i P UDipRiq there must be some a˜ P A such that gpsi, s´iq “ a˜ for all s´i P UD´ipu´iq.
This follows from u˚i paq ´ u
˚
i pbq ‰ u
˚
i pcq ´ u
˚
i pdq for all pa, bq, pc, dq P A
2 with pa, bq ‰
pc, dq. Thus, we have obtained Case (i).
Next suppose that for the si that we fixed in the previous paragraph we have:
gpsi, s´iq ‰ gpsi, s
1
´iq for some s´i, s
1
´i P UD´ipu´iq. Then u
˚
i paq´u
˚
i pbq ‰ u
˚
i pcq´u
˚
i pdq
for all pa, bq, pc, dq P A2 with pa, bq ‰ pc, dq implies that (*) can only hold if both
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sides equal zero, and hence gpsi, s´iq “ gps
1
i, s´iq for all si, s
1
i P UDipRiq and all
s´i P UD´ipR´iq. Thus, we have obtained Case (ii). 
Claim A.5. Suppose for every agent j we have a preference Rj P Rj on A. Then,
for every agent i, either
(i) there is for every strategy si P UDpRiq an alternative a such that gpsi, s´iq “ a
for all s´i P UD´ipR´iq,
or
(ii) there is for every strategy combination s´i P UD´ipR´iq an alternative a such
that gpsi, s´iq “ a for all si P UDipRiq,
or both.
Proof. Claim A.5 follows from Claim A.4 if we represent for each j with j ‰ i
the preference Rj by the utility function u
˚
j referred to in Claim A.3 because then:
UD´ipu
˚
´iq “ UD´ipR´iq. 
Completing the Proof of Theorem 1: The claim is obviously true if there
is an alternative a such that gpsq “ a for all s P UDpRq. Therefore from now on we
restrict attention in this proof to the case that there are two alternatives a ‰ b such
that gpsq “ a for some s P UDpRq and gps1q “ b for some other s1 P UDpRq.
We shall say that agent i P I “has no influence” if for every s´i P UD´ipR´iq there
is an a P A such that gpsi, s´iq “ a for all si P UDipRiq, and we shall say that agent i
is a dictator if agent i has the property ascribed to agent i˚ in Theorem 1. By Claim
A.5 every agent i either has no influence, or is a dictator.
Next note that it cannot be that there is more than one dictator. A dictator can
enforce any of the alternatives contained in tgpsq|s P UDpRqu. We have assumed that
there are at least two such alternatives, say a and b. Having two dictators leads to
a contradiction if one of them chooses an action that enforces a, and the other one
chooses an action that enforces b.
Finally note that it cannot be that all agents have no influence. Recall that we
are considering the case in which there are two alternatives a ‰ b such that gpsq “
a for some s P UDpRq and gps1q “ b for some other s1 P UDpRq. Consider the
sequence of n strategy combinations sk obtained by switching sequentially first agent
1, then agent 2, etc. from strategy si to strategy s
1
i. Thus, s
1 “ ps1
1
, s2, . . . , snq,
s2 “ ps1
1
, s1
2
, s3 . . . , snq, etc. Define s
0 “ s. Because gps0q ‰ gpsnq, there must be
some k such that gpskq ‰ gpsk´1q. But this means that by construction agent k has
influence. Hence agent k must be a dictator. 
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Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Part (1) of Theorem 2 is obvious. Here, we only provide the proof for part (2).
Consider a type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and let:
i˚ P
č
R P
Ś
iPI
Ri
I˚pRq.
We shall show that, for all i ‰ i˚ and all Ri P Ri, the set UDipRiq contains exactly one
element. Suppose that, for some i and Ri, the set UDipRiq had two distinct elements,
say si and s
1
i. Consider any s´i P S´i. We claim that gpsi, s´iq “ gps
1
i, s´iq. To see
this, first note that s´i P UD´ipR´iq for some R´i P
Ś
j‰iRj , because we assume
that every strategy is not weakly dominated for some utility function. Now consider
the preference profile pRi, R´iq. Since agent i
˚ is local dictator for this preference
profile, for any s˚i P UDi˚pRi˚q, there is an a P A such that: gpsi˚, s´i˚q “ a for
all s´i˚ P UD´i˚pR´i˚q. This implies: gpsi˚, si, s´pi˚,iqq “ gpsi˚, s
1
i, s´pi˚,iqq for all
s´pi˚,iq P UD´pi˚,iqpR´pi˚,iqq. As this holds for all s
˚
i P UDi˚ , the assertion follows. But
this contradicts our assumption that mechanisms do not have duplicate strategies.
Fix any si˚ P Si˚ , and consider the mechanism in which we have removed agent
i˚ from the set of agents, in which all other agents have the same strategy sets as
originally, i.e., Sj , and in which the outcome corresponding to any s´i˚ is given by
gpsi˚, s´i˚q. Let us call this mechanism the “restricted mechanism” corresponding
to si˚. If all agents j ‰ i play the strategies that are uniquely dominant in the
overall mechanism, then the restricted mechanism implements an outcome function:
Fs
i˚
: U´i ˆM´i Ñ A. Because, in the overall mechanism, agents have dominant
strategies, the outcome correspondence is constant with respect to beliefs, and it
is also constant if utility functions are changed without changing the order of the
elements of A. We can therefore write F as: Fs
i˚
:
Ś
j‰i˚ Rj Ñ A. We can treat this
outcome function as a direct mechanism. Because agents choose dominant strategies
in the overall mechanism, in the direct mechanism it is a dominant strategy for each
agent to report their preferences truthfully.
Because in the overall mechanism agents have uniquely dominant strategies, they
must have for every preference ordering a strategy that induces in each of the re-
stricted mechanisms a dominant strategy. Agent i˚ thus expects, for each of the
strategies that he can choose, the same outcome distribution as he would in the se-
quential mechanism described in Theorem 2, if the second stage mechanisms are the
restricted mechanisms described by the outcome function Fs
i˚
. Agent i˚ will make
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the same choice as in the sequential mechanism as in the given type 1 strategically
simple mechanism. This implies part (ii) of Theorem 2. 
Appendix C. Further Properties of Strategically Simple Mechanisms
In this section of the appendix we provide some general properties of strategically
simple mechanisms that will be useful for the proofs of our results for the bilateral
trade and the voting applications. This section’s results rely on the domain assump-
tions in Theorem 1, but they are not restricted to the applications, and therefore also
complement the main text’s results on strategically simple mechanisms in general.
Before we turn to our results on strategically simple mechanisms, we record a simple
observation that is a direct implication of the notion of weak dominance, and that is
unrelated to strategic simplicity.
Lemma 1. Let i P I, Ri, R
1
i P Ri, and si P UDipRiq. Then there exists s
1
i P UDipR
1
iq
such that for all s´i P S´i:
gps1i, s´iqR
1
igpsi, s´iq.
Proof. If si P UDipR
1
iq, the lemma is true if we set s
1
i “ si. If si R UDipR
1
iq, because we
are considering finite mechanisms, there is some s2i P UDipR
1
iq that weakly dominates
si, and the lemma follows if we set s
1
i “ s
2
i . 
For the main results of this section of the appendix, we need some additional
notation. For each i P I and each s´i P S´i, let:
Mips´iq ” tgpsi, s´iq|si P Siu, and
bips´i, Riq ” argmax
Ri
Mips´iq.
In words, Mips´iq is the set of all possible outcomes when agent i’s opponents choose
s´i, and bips´i, Riq is agent i’s most preferred outcome in the set Mips´iq if agent i’s
preference is Ri. In this paper, we say that Mips´iq is the “menu” offered to agent i
if the other agents choose s´i.
Lemma 2. Consider a strategically simple mechanism under the domain assumptions
in Theorem 1. Suppose that for some R´i P R´i the set UD´ipR´iq has at least two
elements. Let Ri P Ri.
(1) Suppose that for some s1´i, s
2
´i P UD´ipR´iq we have bips
1
´i, Riq ‰ bips
2
´i, Riq.
Then for all s´i P UD´ipR´iq and all si P UDipRiq:
gpsi, s´iq “ bips´i, Riq.
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(2) Suppose that for some s1´i, s
2
´i P UD´ipR´iq we have bips
1
´i, Riq “ bips
2
´i, Riq “
a for some outcome a. Then there exists some strategy si P UDipRiq such that:
gpsi, s
1
´iq “ gpsi, s
2
´iq “ a.
Moreover, for all si P UDipRiq we have:
gpsi, s
1
´iq “ gpsi, s
2
´iq.
In words, this lemma says the following. Consider any agent i. Consider any prefer-
ence profile for which at least one agent other than i has more than one undominated
strategy. Each of the profiles of undominated strategies of the other agents offers a
menu to agent i, and from each of these menus we can determine the outcome that
agent i prefers most. In case (1), agent i’s preferred alternative is different for two
such menus. In this case, all undominated strategies of agent i must yield agent i’s
most preferred alternative from the menu offered by the other agents for all undomi-
nated strategy profiles of the other agents. In case (2), agent i’s preferred alternative
is the same for two such menus. In this case, some, but not all undominated strate-
gies of agent i must yield agent i’s most preferred alternative from the menu offered
by the other agents. In case (2) every other undominated strategy of agent i must,
however, yield the same outcome, regardless of which undominated strategy profile
the other agents choose.
Proof. (1) Without loss of generality, let bips
1
´i, Riq “ a and bips
2
´i, Riq “ b. Also
without loss of generality, we assume that Ri ranks a above b. Therefore, a RMips
2
´iq.
By Lemma 1, agent i has an undominated strategy s1i such that gps
1
i, s
1
´iq “ a. Because
a R Mips
2
´iq, we know that gps
1
i, s
2
´iq ‰ a. This means that agent i is not the local
dictator, and hence some agent other than agent i must be the local dictator. That is,
for every strategy s´i P UD´ipR´iq, the outcome is independent of agent i’s strategy
si P UDipRiq. Moreover, by Lemma 1, the outcome has to be agent i’s most preferred
outcome in the set Mips´iq.
(2) Suppose that there is no strategy si P UDipRiq such that gpsi, s
1
´iq “ gpsi, s
2
´iq “
a. Since bips
1
´i, Riq “ a, by Lemma 1, there must be some s
1
i P UDipRiq such that
gps1i, s
1
´iq “ a. Hence, gps
1
i, s
2
´iq ‰ a. This means that agent i is not the local dictator,
and hence some agent other than agent i must be the local dictator. This implies
that gpsi, s
2
´iq ‰ a for all si P UDipRiq. But this contradicts that bips
2
´i, Riq “ a and
Lemma 1. Thus, we can conclude that there exists some strategy si P UDipRiq such
that gpsi, s
1
´iq “ gpsi, s
2
´iq “ a.
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Now either for all si P UDipRiq we also have gpsi, s
1
´iq “ gpsi, s
2
´iq “ a, in which case
the second part of the assertion obviously holds, or there exists some undominated
strategy that sometimes yields an outcome other than a if her opponents choose s1´i
or s2´i. In the latter case, agent i must be the local dictator, and the second part of
the assertion follows. 
Part (2) of the above lemma has a simple implication. Suppose for some preference
profile of the agents other than i at least one agent has two undominated strategies.
Then no two profiles of undominated strategies of the agents other than i can offer
the same menu to agent i.
Corollary 2. Consider a strategically simple mechanism under the domain assump-
tions of Theorem 1. Suppose that for some R´i P R´i the set UD´ipR´iq has at least
two elements. If s1´i, s
2
´i P UD´ipR´iq and s
1
´i ‰ s
2
´i, then:
Mips
1
´iq ‰Mips
2
´iq.
Proof. The proof is indirect. If Mips
1
´iq “ Mips
2
´iq, then bips
1
´i, Riq “ bips
2
´i, Riq for
all Ri P Ri. Therefore, case (2) of Lemma 2 applies, and for any strategy of agent i
that is undominated for some preference (in other words, for all strategies of agent
i), s1´i and s
2
´i yield the same outcome. They are thus duplicate strategies. But
this contradicts our assumption that the mechanism does not contain any duplicate
strategies. 
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2
To simplify the notation, we shall use “vi” not just to refer to agent i’s value of the
object, but also to refer to the corresponding ordinal preference. We use UDipviq to
denote the set of strategies of agent i that are not weakly dominated if agent i has ordi-
nal preference vi. We use I
˚pvS, vBq to denote the set of local dictators at preference
profile pvS, vBq. Finally, for any pvS, vBq, we denote by OpvS, vBq the set of out-
comes that can arise when both agents play strategies that are not weakly dominated
given their valuations. That is, OpvS, vBq ” ta P A | a “ gpsS, sBq for some sS P
UDSpvSq and sB P UDBpvBqu.
We now prove four claims that will be useful in the proof of the proposition. These
claims describe implications of strategic simplicity in the bilateral trade setting, re-
gardless of whether we are referring to type 1 or type 2 strategic simplicity.
Claim D.1. If I˚pvS, vBq “ tS,Bu, then |OpvS, vBq| “ 1.
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Proof. This immediately follows from the definition of local dictatorship: if one agent
were able to enforce two different outcomes, then the other agent could not be a local
dictator. 
ClaimD.2. If I˚pvS, vBq “ ti
˚u for some i˚ P I, then |OpvS, vBq| ě 2, and OpvS, vBqX
T ‰ H.
Proof. The first part of the claim follows from the fact that if OpvS, vBq had just one
element, then both agents would be local dictators. The second part of the claim is
a direct implication of the first part. 
ClaimD.2 implies that the following notations for pairs pvS, vBq such that I
˚pvS, vBq
HagertyRogerson1987 “ ti˚u for some i˚ P I are well-defined: t¯pvS, vBq ” maxOpvS, vBq
XT and tpvS, vBq ” minOpvS, vBq X T .
Next, we show that the assumption that each agent has an opting out strategy
implies that only ex post individually rational outcomes can occur when agents do
not choose weakly dominated strategies.
Claim D.3. For any pvS, vBq P VSˆVB, for every i P tS,Bu, agent i with preferences
vi weakly prefers every outcome in OpvS, vBq to no trade.
Proof. The claim is straightforward for outcomes when both agents are local dictators.
By Lemma 1, each agent weakly prefers at least one outcome in OpvS, vBq to no trade.
By Claim D.1, if both agents are local dictators, OpvS, vBq has just one element.
Hence, both agents must weakly prefer this outcome to no trade.
In the rest of the proof we focus on the case of a unique local dictator, IpvS, vBq “
ti˚u. Consider first the agent who is not the local dictator, i.e. agent i ‰ i˚. Obvi-
ously, it is sufficient to consider only outcomes in OpvS, vBq that correspond to trade
at some price t P T . Consider any strategy si˚ P UDi˚pvi˚q of agent i
˚ that results
in trade at price t against any strategy in UDipviq (see Figure 2). Because i has an
opting out strategy, by Lemma 1 one of the strategies in UDipviq must yield at least
as good an outcome as no trade for agent i with preferences vi. This implies that
trade at price t must be at least as good as no trade for agent i with preference vi.
We are left with the task to show that, when there is a unique local dictator i˚, all
outcomes are ex post individually rational for the local dictator herself. Without loss
of generality we consider the case i˚ “ S. Our proof strategy will be the following.
We consider any pvS, vBq such that ex post individual rationality for the seller is
violated at pvS, vBq. We show that then there must be some v
1
S ą vS and some v
1
B
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si˚ t t ¨ ¨ ¨ t
opting out
H
H
¨¨
¨
H
UDi˚pvi˚q
UDipviq
Figure 2. Agent i˚ is the unique local dictator at pvS , vBq. In this case,
trade at price t must not be worse than no trade for agent i with value vi.
such that I˚pv1S, v
1
Bq “ tSu and ex post individual rationality for the seller is also
violated at pv1S, v
1
Bq. This implies the claim, because the assumption that there is any
value profile at which the seller’s ex post individual rationality were violated would
imply that there would have to be a largest vS P I
˚
S for which individual rationality
is violated for some vB, and this would be in contradiction with the assertion that we
just made.
Thus, consider any pvS, vBq such that I
˚pvS, vBq “ tSu and the seller’s individual
rationality is violated at pvS, vBq (see Figure 3). This means that there is a strategy
sS P UDSpvSq for which gpsS, sBq P T , and gpsS, sBq ă vS for all sB P UDBpvBq. To
start, note that there must exist some v1B P VB and s
1
B P UDBpv
1
Bq such that vS ranks
gpsS, s
1
Bq above no trade. Otherwise, for the seller with preference vS, the strategy sS
would be weakly dominated by the strategy of opting out. Since vS ranks gpsS, s
1
Bq
above no trade, we have gpsS, s
1
Bq P T and gpsS, s
1
Bq ą vS.
Our next objective is to prove the following statements about the behavior of the
mechanism at pvS, vBq and pvS, v
1
Bq. Here, sB is any arbitrary strategy in UDBpvBq.
(i) B is the unique local dictator at pvS, v
1
Bq;
(ii) gpsS, s
1
Bq ą gpsS, sBq;
(iii) gpsS, sBq ą v
1
B;
(iv) gpsS, s
1
Bq ą v
1
B.
Proving piiq is simple: We have gpsS, sBq ă vS, and, by construction, gpsS, s
1
Bq ą
vS. Thus, piiq follows. Now note that gpsS, s
1
Bq ą gpsS, sBq implies that v
1
B ranks
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¨¨¨
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H
H
¨¨
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gpsS , sBq ¨ ¨ ¨ gpsS , sBq
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S
, s1
B
q ¨ ¨ ¨ gps1
S
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B
q
UDSpvSq
UDSpv
1
S
q
UDBpvBq UDBpv
1
B
q
Figure 3. The seller is the unique local dictator at pvS , vBq. Suppose that
gpsS , sBq ă vS . We then find a v
1
S ą vS such that gps
1
S , s
1
Bq ă v
1
S .
gpsB, s
1
Bq below gpsS, sBq. By Lemma 1, there must be some strategy s
2
B P UDBpv
1
Bq
such that v1B ranks gpsS, s
2
Bq above gpsS, sBq or gpsS, s
2
Bq “ gpsS, sBq. Note that we
can conclude gpsS, sBq ‰ gpsS, s
2
Bq, and hence that piq is true.
As an intermediate step we show next that gpsS, s
2
Bq “ φ. If gpsS, s
2
Bq were an
element of T , since v1B ranks gpsS, s
2
Bq above gpsS, sBq or gpsS, s
2
Bq “ gpsS, sBq, it
would have to be that gpsS, s
2
Bq ď gpsS, sBq. Since vS ranks gpvS, vBq below no trade,
vS also ranks gpsS, s
2
Bq below no trade. But this contradicts the ex post individual
rationality for the agent who is not dictator, which we showed in an earlier step of
this proof. We conclude: gpsS, s
2
Bq “ φ.
By construction, v1B ranks gpsS, s
2
Bq above gpsS, sBq, hence piiiq follows from the
fact that gpsS, s
2
Bq is no trade. Finally, piiq and piiiq imply pivq.
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Now note that we have obtained a pair of valuations at which the buyer is the local
dictator, and, by pivq, the buyer’s ex post individual rationality is violated. We can
therefore repeat the argument just presented, reversing the roles of the buyer and the
seller. This yields the conclusion that there is some v1S P VS, and some s
1
S P UDpv
1
Sq
such that gps1S, s
1
Bq P T and gps
1
S, s
1
Bq ă v
1
B, and:
(v) S is the local dictator at pv1S, v
1
Bq;
(vi) gps1S, s
1
Bq ă gpsS, s
1
Bq;
(vii) gpsS, s
1
Bq ă v
1
S;
(viii) gps1S, s
1
Bq ă v
1
S.
The proof can now be concluded. By construction: vS ă gpsS, s
1
Bq. Result pviiq
says: gpsS, s
1
Bq ă v
1
S. Hence vS ă v
1
S. Moreover pviiiq shows that ex post individual
rationality for the seller is violated at pv1S, v
1
Bq. 
Our next result shows that, if at some valuation profile some agent i is the unique
local dictator, this agent remains (not necessarily unique) local dictator even if we
change i’s valuation, keeping the other valuation fixed.
Claim D.4. Suppose I˚pvi, v´iq “ tiu. Then i P I
˚pv1i, v´iq for all v
1
i P Vi.
Proof. Without loss of generality we focus on the case i “ S. The proof is indirect.
Let I˚pvS, vBq “ tSu, and suppose I
˚pvS, vBq “ tBu for some v
1
S P VS. Let sS P SS
be the strategy in UDSpvSq that enforces the outcome t¯pvS, vBq against any strategy
in UDBpvBq. Let sB P SB be the strategy in UDBpvBq that enforces the outcome
t¯pv1S, vBq against any strategy in UDSpv
1
Sq.
Suppose also, first, that: t¯pv1S, vBq ą t¯pvS, vBq. By Lemma D.3, vS ranks t¯pvS, vBq
above no trade. Therefore, vS must also rank t¯pv
1
S, vBq above no trade. By Lemma 1,
the seller with value vS must have a strategy in UDSpvSq that guarantees an outcome
at least as good as t¯pv1S, vBq against any strategy in UDBpvBq. This contradicts the
definition of t¯pvS, vBq as the highest price that the seller can guarantee with a strategy
in UDSpvSq.
Now suppose: t¯pv1S, vBq ă t¯pvS, vBq. By Lemma 1, the seller with value v
1
S must
have at least one strategy in UDSpv
1
Sq that yields against sB an outcome at least as
good as t¯pvS, vBq. This contradicts that sB yields t¯pv
1
S, vBq for all sS P UDSpvSq.
Finally suppose: t¯pv1S, vBq “ t¯pvS, vBq. Let s
1
B P UDBpvBq denote a strategy such
that gpsS, s
1
Bq ‰ t¯pv
1
S, vBq for all sS P UDSpv
1
Sq. By Claim D.2, such an s
1
B exists.
Since the buyer is the unique local dictator at preference profile pv1S, vBq, by Lemma
1, any strategy in UDSpv
1
Sq yields against s
1
B an outcome at least as good as t¯pvS, vBq.
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This outcome cannot be trade at price t¯pvS, vBq, because s
1
B leads to an outcome other
than t¯pvS, vBq, and it cannot be trade at a price higher than t¯pvS, vBq because we are
considering the case t¯pv1S, vBq “ t¯pvS, vBq. Therefore, any strategy in UDSpv
1
Sq yields
against s1B no trade. But then we have concluded that the seller prefers no trade to
trade at t¯pvS, vBq, which contradicts Claim D.3, i.e. the seller’s ex post individual
rationality at pvS, vBq and at pv
1
S, vBq. 
We now turn to an indirect proof of Proposition 2, that is, we postulate that a
bilateral trade mechanism is type 2 strategically simple, and then derive a contra-
diction. The next four claims describe implications of the premises of the indirect
proof.
Claim D.5. There are vS, vˆS P VS with vS ‰ vˆS and vB, vˆB P VB with vB ‰ vˆB such
that: I˚pvS, vBq “ tSu, I
˚pvˆS, vˆBq “ tBu, and I
˚pvS, vˆBq “ I
˚pvˆS, vBq “ tS,Bu.
Proof. By definition of type 2 strategic simplicity, we must have two pairs of values
in VS ˆ VB, one at which S is the unique local dictator, and another one at which B
is the unique local dictator. By Claim D.4 these two pairs must have no component
in common. Claim D.4 also implies that if we combine the seller’s value in one pair
with a buyer’s value in the other pair, then both agents must be local dictators. 
For the remainder of the proof we use the notation pvS, vBq and pvˆS, vˆBq to refer to
the two pairs the existence of which is asserted in Claim D.5.
Claim D.6. OpvS, vˆBq “ tφu.
Proof. By Claim D.1, OpvS, vˆBq has only one element. Suppose OpvS, vˆBq “ ttu for
some t P T . Using Lemma 1 for the buyer, we can infer t ď tpvS, vBq. Because at
pvB, vSq the seller is the only local dictator, Claim D.2 implies that the set OpvS, vBq
must include an outcome a other than tpvS, vBq. If this is trade at a price higher
than tpvS, vBq, then clearly the buyer strictly prefers tpvS, vBq to a. But if a is no
trade, then Claim D.3 implies that the buyer strictly prefers tpvS, vBq to a. Thus,
OpvS, vBq includes an outcome a that the buyer ranks strictly below tpvS, vBq, and
hence also strictly below t. The seller has a strategy that locally enforces this outcome
at pvS, vBq. By Lemma 1 this contradicts the fact that the buyer has a strategy that
enforces at pvS, vˆBq the price t. 
Claim D.7. vS ą vˆS and vB ą vˆB.
Proof. The arguments are symmetric for seller and buyer. Consider the seller. Be-
cause no trade occurs at pvS, vˆBq, by Claim D.6, and trade at some price t is a possible
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outcome at pvˆS, vˆBq, Lemma 1 implies that with value vS the seller must find no trade
preferable to a trade at price t. Claim D.3 says that the seller with value vˆS prefers
trade at price t to no trade. These findings together imply vS ą vˆS. 
Claim D.8. OpvˆS, vBq “ tt
˚u for some t˚ P T .
Proof. By Claim D.1, OpvˆS, vBq has only one element. Suppose OpvˆS, vBq “ tφu. By
Claims D.2 and D.3, trade at some price is contained in OpvS, vBq that the seller
with value vS strictly prefers to no trade. When the seller has value vˆS, the seller still
strictly prefers trade at that price to no trade, because, by Claim D.7, vˆS is lower than
vS. Hence we would have a contradiction to Lemma 1 if the outcome in OpvˆS, vBq
were no trade. 
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 2. Using Lemma 1 we have: t˚ “
tpvˆS, vˆBq. By Claim D.3, t
˚ ď vˆB. Using Lemma 1 we also have: t
˚ “ t¯pvS, vBq. But
then Lemma 1 and t˚ ď vˆB implies that among the outcomes in OpvˆB, vSq there must
be a trade at a price below vˆB. This contradicts Claim D.6. 
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3
Let A “ ta, b, cu. Suppose that a mechanism is a strategically simple mechanism of
type 2. We shall analyze properties of such a mechanism that ultimately imply that,
up to relabeling of the agents and the alternatives, only the two mechanisms listed in
Proposition 3 are candidates for type 2 strategically simple mechanisms. The analysis
of these two mechanisms in the main text shows that these mechanisms are indeed
type 2 strategically simple.
Throughout this proof, we shall denote the ordinal preference Ri that satisfies
aRib and bRic by “abc,” and we shall use analogous notation for any other ordinal
preference over the three alternatives.
Claim E.1. There is at least one preference profile pRˆ1, Rˆ2q such that both UD1pRˆ1q
and UD2pRˆ2q have at least two elements.
Proof. At a preference profile at which agent 1 is the unique local dictator, agent
1 must have at least two undominated strategies. At a preference profile at which
agent 2 is the unique local dictator, agent 2 must have at least two undominated
strategies. 
Claim E.2. If for some preference profile pRˆ1, Rˆ2q both UD1pRˆ1q and UD2pRˆ2q have at
least two elements, then the set gpUD1pRˆ1q, UD2pRˆ2qq has no more than two elements.
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Proof. By Theorem 1, there must be a local dictator at pRˆ1, Rˆ2q. Without loss of
generality, assume that agent 2 is a local dictator. If the set gpUD1pRˆ1q, UD2pRˆ2qq
contains three elements, then agent 2, as a local dictator, could enforce each of them.
Therefore, each of agent 1’s undominated strategies would have to offer the same
menu that contains all three elements. But this contradicts Corollary 2. Therefore,
gpUD1pRˆ1q, UDpRˆ2qq has only one or two elements. 
We now distinguish the two cases. Case 1 is the case in which there is at least
one preference profile such that both agents have multiple undominated strategies,
and such that exactly two outcomes may result if both agents with these preferences
choose from their sets of undominated strategies. For this case, we show that the
4 ˆ 4 mechanism in Proposition 3 is the unique strategically simple mechanism, up
to relabeling of the agents and the alternatives. Case 2 is the case in which for
all preference profiles such that both agents have multiple undominated strategies,
exactly one outcome may result if both agents with these preferences choose from
their sets of undominated strategies. For this case, we show that the 5ˆ5 mechanism
in Proposition 3 is the unique strategically simple mechanism, up to relabeling of the
agents and the alternatives.
Case 1: There is at least one preference profile, say pRˆ1, Rˆ2q, such that both agents
have multiple undominated strategies, and such that exactly two outcomes may result,
say gpUD1pRˆ1q, UDpRˆ2qq “ ta, bu, if both agents with these preferences choose from
their sets of undominated strategies.
Figure 4 illustrates the proof for the first case. We shall refer to Figure 4 while
presenting the proof.
We begin our analysis of this case with the observation that with preference Rˆ1
agent 1 has only two undominated strategies.
Claim E.3. UD1pRˆ1q has exactly two elements, one, which we shall denote by sˆ1,
satisfies M2psˆ1q “ ta, b, cu, and the other one, which we shall denote by ˆˆs1, satisfies
M2pˆˆs1q “ ta, bu.
Proof. Because agent 2 is a local dictator at pRˆ1, Rˆ2q, every undominated strategy
of agent 1 has to offer a menu that includes both a and b. There are only two such
menus: ta, b, cu and ta, bu. Because agent 1 has multiple undominated strategies
and each such strategy by Corollary 2 has to offer a different menu, she has exactly
two undominated strategies with one strategy offering menu ta, b, cu and the other
strategy offering menu ta, bu. 
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Figure 4. There is a unique type 2 strategically simple mechanism (up to
relabeling) in Case 1.
Next, we investigate agent 2’s strategy set, and for each of her strategies the out-
come that results if agent 1 chooses sˆ1 or ˆˆs1. Define:
Sa
2
“ ts2 P S2 : gps1, s2q “ a for all s1 P UD1pRˆ1qu, and
Sb
2
“ ts2 P S2 : gps1, s2q “ b for all s1 P UD1pRˆ1qu.
Because, by assumption, in Case 1: gpUD1pRˆ1q, UD2pRˆ2qq “ ta, bu, and because,
also by assumption, agent 2 is the local dictator at pRˆ1, Rˆ2q, there must be at least
one strategy in UD2pRˆ2q that is in S
a
2
, and also at least one strategy in UD2pRˆ2q that
is in Sb
2
. Let us denote the former strategy by sˆ2 and the latter by ˆˆs2. We also know
that all strategies in UD2pRˆ2q are contained in S
a
2
Y Sb
2
. That is because agent 2 is
the local dictator at pRˆ1, Rˆ2q. The top left panel in Figure 4 represents, symbolically,
what we have inferred so far about the mechanism that we are considering.
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The focus of Claims E.4 and E.6 will be strategies of agent 2 that are not in
Sa
2
Y Sb
2
. We shall conclude that there are exactly two such strategies, and we shall
show which outcomes they yield against sˆ1 and ˆˆs1.
Claim E.4. If s2 P S2zpS
a
2
Y Sb
2
q, then either:
gpsˆ1, s2q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s2q “ a,
or
gpsˆ1, s2q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s2q “ b.
Proof. Recall that we have assumed that for every strategy of agent i there is some
preference for which it is undominated. Suppose that R2 ranks a top. Then part (2)
of Lemma 2 implies that UD2pR2q Ď S
a
2
Y Sb
2
. Analogously, if R2 ranks b top, then
UD2pR2q Ď S
a
2
Y Sb
2
. By part (1) of Lemma 2, any s2 P UD2pcabq satisfies:
gpsˆ1, s2q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s2q “ a,
and any s2 P UD2pcbaq satisfies:
gpsˆ1, s2q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s2q “ b.

Before we proceed with our analysis of agent 2’s strategies, we observe that the
conclusions of Claim E.4 allows us to narrow down the set of possible candidates for
the preference Rˆ1.
Claim E.5. Rˆ1 is either acb or bca.
Proof. f Rˆ1 ranks c top, then sˆ1 would weakly dominate ˆˆs1, contradicting that ˆˆs1 P
UD1pRˆ1q. If Rˆ1 ranks c bottom, then ˆˆs1 would weakly dominate sˆ1, contradicting
that sˆ1 P UD1pRˆ1q. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that Rˆ1 “ bca. We now return to our analysis
of agent 2’s strategy set.
Claim E.6. There are exactly two strategies in S2 that are not in S
a
2
Y Sb
2
. One of
these, which we shall denote by scab
2
, satisfies
gpsˆ1, s
cab
2
q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s
cab
2
q “ a,
and the other one, which we shall denote by scba
2
, satisfies
gpsˆ1, s
cba
2
q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s
cba
2
q “ b.
Moreover, UD2pcabq “ ts
cab
2
u and UD2pcbaq “ ts
cba
2
u.
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Proof. The argument in the proof of Claim E.4 shows that it suffices to prove that
UD2pcabq and UD2pcabq each have no more than one element. Without loss of gen-
erality we show this only for UD2pcabq. Suppose that UD2pcabq had more than one
element. By part (1) of Lemma 2, any s2 P UD2pcabq satisfies:
gpsˆ1, s2q “ c and gpˆˆs1, s2q “ a.
Now consider the preference pair consisting of Rˆ1 and of cab. We could apply to this
preference profile the same reasoning as we applied above to the preference profile Rˆ1
and Rˆ2, with the roles of agents 1 and 2 swapped. We could infer, as we did above
in Claim E.5, that agent 2’s preference must be such that b is ranked in the middle.
But this contradicts that agent 2’s preference is cab. 
What we have inferred so far allows us is symbolically represented by the middle
panel in the top row of Figure 4. After we have pinned down the strategies that are
not in Sa
2
Y Sb
2
, we now return to the strategies of agent 2 that are in this set.
Claim E.7. s2 P S
a
2
implies gps1, s2q “ a for all s1 P S1. Moreover, S
a
2
has only one
element, and UDpabcq “ UDpacbq “ Sa
2
.
Proof. The second sentence is an immediate implication of the first sentence, the as-
sumption that there are no duplicate strategies, and the definition of weak dominance.
For an indirect proof of the first sentence, suppose that for some s2 P S
a
2
, we have
gps1, s2q ‰ a for some s1 P S1. Then the preference Rˆ1 “ bca ranks gps1, s2q strictly
above a. But then by Lemma 1, there would have to be a strategy s1
1
P UD1pRˆ1q such
that gps1
1
, s2q is ranked above a. This contradicts that s2 P S
a
2
. 
The right panel in the top row of Figure 4 symbolizes what we have concluded so
far. Next, we can pin down the preference Rˆ2.
Claim E.8. Rˆ2 “ bac.
Proof. It cannot be that Rˆ2 ranks a top, because then sˆ2 would be a dominant strat-
egy, and therefore would contradict with our assumption that Rˆ2 has at least two
undominated strategies. It cannot be that Rˆ2 ranks a bottom, because then sˆ2 would
be weakly dominated. Finally, it cannot be that Rˆ2 ranks c top, because then, by
Lemma 1, UD2pRˆ2q would have to include a strategy that yields c against sˆ1, which
contradicts that UD2pRˆ2q Ď S
a
2
Y Sb
2
. It follows that Rˆ2 “ bac. 
Claim E.9. UD2pbacq “ tsˆ2, ˆˆs2u.
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Proof. From Claim E.7, we know that sˆ2 is the unique element in S
a
2
. We now show
thatM1ps2q “ ta, b, cu for all s2 P S
b
2
XUD2pRˆ2q. It then follows from Corollary 2 that
ˆˆs2 is the unique element in S
b
2
XUD2pRˆ2q. The claim follows since UD2pRˆ2q Ď S
a
2
YSb
2
.
We proceed by elimination. It cannot be that M1ps2q “ tbu, nor that M1ps2q “
ta, bu, because in both cases sˆ2 would be weakly dominated given Rˆ2. It remains to
eliminate the possibility that M1ps2q “ tb, cu.
Suppose that for some s2 P S
b
2
X UD2pRˆ2q, M1ps2q “ tb, cu. First consider the
set of undominated strategies of agent 1 when she has preference acb. Part (1) of
Lemma 2 implies that gps1, s2q “ c for all s1 P UD1pacbq. Next we consider agent 2
when he has preference cab. Recall from Claim E.6 that agent 2 with this preference
has a dominant strategy scab
2
. We can then conclude that gps1, s
cab
2
q “ c for all
s1 P UD1pacbq. But Lemma 1, combined with gpˆˆs1, s
cab
2
q “ a, which we established in
Claim E.6, implies that there must exist some s1
1
P UD1pacbq such that gps
1
1
, scab
2
q “ a.
We have thus obtained a contradiction, and the only remaining possibility is that
M1ps2q “ ta, b, cu for all s2 P S
b
2
X UD2pRˆ2q, which is what we wanted to show. 
By now, we know that agent 2, if he ranks a top, has a dominant strategy sˆ2. We
also know that for every preference that ranks c top, agent 2 has a dominant strategy,
as described in Claim E.6. Finally, we know that agent 2 with preference bac has
two undominated strategies: sˆ2 and ˆˆs2. The left panel in the middle row of Figure
4 symbolically represents what we have obtained so far. In the next step, we shall
investigate agent 2’s undominated strategies if he has preference bca.
Claim E.10. |UD2pbcaq| “ 1.
Proof. We first show that UD2pbcaq Ď S
b
2
. By part (2) of Lemma 2, and by the
results that we have so far obtained for agent 2’s strategy set, we have to have:
UD2pbcaq Ď S
a
2
Y Sb
2
. If there exists a strategy s2 P UD2pbcaq but s2 R S
b
2
, then what
we have established so far implies that it must be the strategy sˆ2. But sˆ2 is weakly
dominated if agent 2 has preference bca. Therefore, we conclude UD2pbcaq Ď S
b
2
.
Strategies in UD2pbcaq cannot offer the menu tbu or ta, bu, because then the strategy
corresponding to this menu would weakly dominate sˆ2 for agent 2 with preference bac,
which contracts with Claim E.8. Thus, strategies in UD2pbcaq must either offer tb, cu
or ta, b, cu.
Suppose that UD2pbcaq has at least two elements. Then Corollary 2 implies that
there are exactly two strategies in UD2pbcaq, with one strategy offering the menu tb, cu
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and the other strategy offering the menu ta, b, cu. In what follows, we show that this
leads to a contradiction.
First consider agent 1 with preference acb. By part (1) of Lemma 2, each of her
undominated strategies s1 P UD1pacbq must satisfy (1) gps1, s2q “ c if s2 P UD2pbcaq
and M1ps2q “ tb, cu; and (2) gps1, s2q “ a if s2 P UD2pbcaq and M1ps2q “ ta, b, cu.
Now consider agent 2 with preference cab. Claim E.6 showed that agent 2 with this
preference has a dominant strategy scab
2
. Because the strategy is dominant, we have to
have: gps1, s
cab
2
q “ c for all s1 P UD1pacbq. Claim E.6 also showed that gpˆˆs1, s
cab
2
q “ a.
But Lemma 1 then implies that gps1, s
cab
2
q “ a for at least one s1 P UD1pacbq. We
have found a contradiction. 
Since |UD2pbcaq| “ 1, agent 2 with preference bca also has a dominant strategy.
We denote this strategy by sbca
2
. Our discussion of agent 2’s strategy set so far says
that agent 2 has either four (if sbca
2
“ ˆˆs2) or five (if s
bca
2
‰ ˆˆs2) strategies. We will
resolve this question in the last step for Case 1. For the moment, we turn to agent
1’s strategies.
Claim E.11. For all s1 P S1zUD1pbcaq we have b RM2ps1q.
Proof. The proof is indirect. Suppose that there exists some s1 P S1zUD1pbcaq such
that b P M2ps1q. We are going to show that s1 is a duplicate of one of the strategies
in UD1pbcaq, which contradicts our assumption that there are no duplicate strategies.
We distinguish two cases. The first is that M2ps1q “ ta, bu, and the second case is
that M2ps1q “ ta, b, cu. The arguments for the two cases are completely analogous.
Therefore, here we only deal with the case that M2ps1q “ ta, bu. Applying Lemma
1 to agent 2 with preference bac, we can conclude that gps1, ˆˆs2q “ b. Because for all
other preferences agent 2 has dominant strategies that we have already identified, we
can conclude that:
gps1, sˆ2q “ gps1, s
cab
2
q “ a and gps1, s
cba
2
q “ gps1, s
bca
2
q “ b.
This implies that s1 is a duplicate strategy of ˆˆs1. 
This claim implies that strategies that are not in UD1pbcaq must yield either a or c
against any other strategy of agent 2. Let us focus on the alternative that they yield
when agent 2 chooses ˆˆs2. The next two claims show that there is only one strategy
outside of UD1pbcaq that yields c against ˆˆs2, and also only one such strategy that
yields a against ˆˆs2. This then implies that agent 1 has only four strategies, the two
strategies in UD1pbcaq, and the two strategies not in UD1pbcaq.
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Claim E.12. There is a unique strategy s1 P S1zUD1pbcaq such that gps1, ˆˆs2q “ c.
Furthermore, for this strategy we have:
gps1, s
bca
2
q “ gps1, s
cab
2
q “ gps1, s
cba
2
q “ c.
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Claim E.9, we concluded that M1pˆˆs2q “ ta, b, cu.
This implies that there is at least one strategy s1 such that gps1, ˆˆs2q “ c. From
Claims E.7 and E.11, we know that M2ps1q “ ta, cu. Because we already know
that agent 2 with preferences bca, cab, or cba has dominant strategies, we know that
gps1, s
bca
2
q “ gps1, s
cab
2
q “ gps1, s
cba
2
q “ c. We have now pinned down for all strategies
of agent 2 which outcome results if agent 1 chooses a strategy s1 P S1zUD1pbcaq such
that gps1, ˆˆs2q “ c. The uniqueness of such a strategy is therefore a consequence of
the assumption that there are no duplicate strategies. 
Claim E.13. There is a unique strategy s1 such that gps1, ˆˆs2q “ a. Furthermore, for
this strategy we have:
gps1, s
bca
2
q “ gps1, s
cab
2
q “ gps1, s
cba
2
q “ a.
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Claim E.9, we concluded that M1pˆˆs2q “ ta, b, cu.
This implies that there is at least one strategy s1 such that gps1, ˆˆs2q “ a. From Claim
E.11 we can then infer that: M2ps1q is either tau or ta, cu. For ease of notation, let:
Sa
1
“ ts1 P S1 : gps1, sˆ2q “ gps1, ˆˆs2q “ au.
We first show that there exists at least one strategy s1 P S
a
1
that offers the menu
tau. The proof is indirect. Suppose that M2ps1q “ ta, cu for all s1 P S
a
1
. We must
have:
gps1, s
bca
2
q “ gps1, s
cab
2
q “ gps1, s
cba
2
q “ c
for all s1 P S
a
1
. This is because all the strategies of agent 2 that we are referring to
are dominant strategies. Because there are no duplicate strategies, we obtain that
there is a unique element s1 in S
a
1
, and that for this strategy
gps1, s
bca
2
q “ gps1, s
cab
2
q “ gps1, s
cba
2
q “ c.
Now consider agent 1 who ranks a top. The unique element in Sa
1
cannot be weakly
dominated, because this is the only strategy that yields outcome a against strategy ˆˆs2.
But since gpˆˆs1, s
cab
2
q “ a, by Lemma 1, she must have another undominated strategy
that yields a against scab
2
. But then, if agent 1 has a preference that ranks a top,
and agent 2 has preference bac, there is no local dictator. Thus we have obtained a
contradiction.
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Therefore, there must exist at least one strategy s1 P S
a
1
such that M2ps1q “ tau.
Because there are no duplicate strategies, there can only be one such strategy. But
now suppose there is also a strategy s1
1
P Sa
1
with M2ps1q “ ta, cu. As before, it
follows that
gps1
1
, scba
2
q “ gps1
1
, sbca
2
q “ gps1
1
, scab
2
q “ c.
But note that s1
1
cannot be undominated for any preference, and we have ruled out
that strategies that are not dominated for all preferences are included in the mecha-
nism. The claim follows. 
What we have found so far establishes that agent 1 has four strategies and agent
2 has either four (if sbca
2
“ ˆˆs2) or five (if s
bca
2
‰ ˆˆs2) strategies. Moreover, for any
strategy combination, we know which outcome results. If agent 2 has five strategies,
then the mechanism must take the form shown in the left panel in the bottom row
of Figure 4. But note that in that panel ˆˆs2 and s
bca
2
are duplicate strategies. Because
we have assumed that there are no duplicate strategies, we can conclude that agent
2 has four strategies and the mechanism is the one shown in the right panel in the
bottom row of Figure 4. This completes the proof for Case 1.
Case 2: For all preference profiles such that both agents have multiple undominated
strategies, exactly one outcome may result if agents choose from the strategies that
are undominated for these preference profiles.
Let us denote by pR˜1, R˜2q a preference profile for which both agents have more
than one undominated strategies. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
gpUD1pR˜1q, UD2pR˜2qq “ tau.
Figure 5 illustrates the proof for the second case. We shall refer to Figure 5 while
presenting the proof. The left panel in the top row shows the starting point of the
proof. We begin with an analysis of the sets UDipR˜iq for each agent and of the menus
offered by the strategies in these sets.
Claim E.14. If s1 P UD1pR˜1q then M2ps1q ‰ tau. (The analogous statement for
agent 2 can be proved in the same way.)
Proof. The proof is indirect. Suppose that M2ps1q “ tau for some s1 P UD1pR˜1q.
Let s1
1
be another element of UD1pR˜1q. First observe that M2ps
1
1
q has to be ta, b, cu,
because in all other cases, for every preference of agent 1, either s1 weakly dominates
s1
1
or the other way round.
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Figure 5. There is a unique type 2 strategically simple mechanism (up to
relabeling) in the second case.
For both s1 and s
1
1
to be undominated for agent 1 with preference R˜1, it must be
that R˜1 ranks a in the middle. Without loss of generality, we assume that R˜1 “ bac.
By Lemma 1, we conclude that b RM1ps2q for any s2 P UD2pR˜2q.
Now let s2 and s
1
2
denote two different elements of UD2pR˜2q. We just concluded
that neither strategy offers a menu that includes b. By Corollary 1, they have to
offer different menus, and therefore, without loss of generality, we can write that
M1ps2q “ tau and M1ps
1
2
q “ ta, cu. But then there is no preference of agent 2 under
which both s2 and s
1
2
are undominated. 
Claim E.15. The set UD1pR˜1q has exactly two elements, say s˜1 and ˜˜s1. Moreover,
for one of these two strategies, say s˜1, we have: M2ps˜1q “ ta, b, cu. For the other
strategy, either M2p˜˜s1q “ ta, bu or M2p˜˜s1q “ ta, cu. (The analogous claim is true for
agent 2.)
Proof. The claim follows from Claim E.14 and Corollary 2 once we rule out the case
in which that there are simultaneously a strategy in UD1pR˜1q that offers menu ta, bu
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and another strategy in UD1pR˜1q that offers menu ta, cu. We prove indirectly that
this cannot be the case.
Thus we assume that there is a strategy s1 P UD1pR˜1q with M2ps1q “ ta, bu and
another strategy s1
1
P UD1pR˜1q with M2ps
1
1
q “ ta, cu. By Lemma 1, it would have to
be the case that for agent 2 with preference bca, there is an undominated strategy
that yields b against s1 and also an undominated strategy that yields c against s
1
1
.
Therefore, we would conclude that gpUD1pR˜1q, UD2pbcaqq “ 2. By the definition of
case 2, it has to be that UD2pbcaq has just one element. In other words, agent 2 with
preference bca has a dominant strategy sbca
2
. Using the same arguments as above, we
can conclude that agent 2 with preference cba has a dominant strategy scba
2
.
Now consider any two different strategies s2, s
1
2
P UD2pR˜2q. By assumption, both
strategies’ menus include a, and by Claim E.14 cannot only include a. Therefore,
at least one of these menus must contain exactly two elements, one of which is a.
Without loss of generality let the other one be c. Thus, we consider: M1ps2q “ ta, cu.
By Corollary 2, s1
2
has to offer a different menu, and this implies: b PM1ps
1
2
q.
Using the same argument as in the second paragraph of the current proof, we can
conclude that agent 1 with preference bca has a dominant strategy, say sbca
1
, and that
gpsbca
1
, s2q “ c, and that gps
bca
1
, s1
2
q “ b.
Now consider gpsbca
1
, scba
2
q. Because sbca
1
is a dominant strategy for agent 1 with
preference bca, and because gps1, s
cba
2
q “ b, it follows that gpsbca
1
, scba
2
q “ b. But simi-
larly, because scba
2
is a dominant strategy for agent 2 with preference cba, and because
gpsbca
1
, s2q “ c, it follows that gps
bca
1
, scba
2
q “ c. We have obtained a contradiction. 
Without loss of generality, we now assume that M2p˜˜s1q “ ta, bu. Next, we show
that, as a consequence, we have to have that M1p˜˜s2q “ ta, bu.
Claim E.16. M1p˜˜s2q “ ta, bu.
Proof. The proof is indirect. Suppose that M1p˜˜s2q “ ta, cu. As in the proof of claim
E.15, we can then infer that agent 1 with preference bca has a dominant strategy
sbca
1
. Furthermore, gpsbca
1
, s˜2q “ b and gps
bca
1
, ˜˜s2q “ c. Similarly, the assumption that
M2p˜˜s1q “ ta, bu implies that agent 2 with preference cba has a dominant strategy s
cba
2
.
Furthermore, gps˜1, s
cba
2
q “ c and gp˜˜s1, s
cba
2
q “ b. A contradiction is then reached as in
the proof of claim E.15 by showing that gpsbca
1
, scba
2
q has to be simultaneously b and
c. 
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Claim E.17. Agent 1 with preference cab has a dominant strategy scab
1
, and gpscab
1
, s˜2q “
c and gpscab
1
, ˜˜s2q “ a. Agent 1 with preference cba has a dominant strategy s
cba
1
, and
gpscba
1
, s˜2q “ c and gps
cba
1
, ˜˜s2q “ b. (The analogous claims are true for agent 2.)
Proof. This follows from the arguments used in the second paragraph of the proof of
claim E.15. 
At this point we have a good understanding of the sets UDipR˜iq and of the menus
offered by the strategies in these sets. What we have obtained so far is symbolically
represented in the right panel in the top row in Figure 5. (Observe that the strategies
scabi and s
cba
i are not contained in UDpR˜iq.)
Claim E.18. If agent 1 ranks a top, then every undominated strategy s1 of agent 1
satisfies gps1, s˜2q “ gps1, ˜˜s2q “ a. If agent 1 ranks b top, then every undominated
strategy s1 of agent 1 satisfies gps1, s˜2q “ gps1, ˜˜s2q “ b. (The analogous claims are
true for agent 2.)
Proof. This follows from part (2) of Lemma 2 and from the definition of Case 2. 
Claim E.19. R˜1 “ R˜2 “ acb.
Proof. Claims E.17 and E.18 show that an agent with multiple undominated strategies
must rank a top. This leaves just two possible preferences: abc and acb. But if
R˜1 “ abc, then clearly ˜˜s1 would weakly dominate s˜1. 
Claim E.20. There is a unique strategy, say sb
1
, such that, if agent 1 ranks b top,
then this strategy is dominant. Moreover, gpsb
1
, s2q “ b for all s2 P S2. (The analogous
statement is true for agent 2.)
Proof. By Claim E.18, if agent 1 ranks b top, every undominated strategy s1 of agent
1 satisfies: gps1, s˜2q “ gps1, ˜˜s2q “ b. Claim E.19 showed that R˜2 “ acb, which
ranks b bottom. Therefore, by Lemma 1, we have to have that gps1, s2q “ b for
all s2 P S2. There can only be one such strategy, because there are no duplicate
strategies. Moreover, this strategy is dominant whenever agent 1 ranks b top. 
The left panel in the bottom row of Figure 5 shows what we have inferred so far
about the mechanism.
Claim E.21. For agent 1 with preference abc, strategy ˜˜s1 is dominant. (The analo-
gous statement is true for agent 2.)
Proof. Consider agent 1 with preference abc. Whenever agent 2’s strategy is undom-
inated for a preference that puts a top, then, by Claim E.18, if agent 1 chooses ˜˜s1,
56 TILMAN BO¨RGERS AND JIANGTAO LI
the outcome is a, which is agent 1’s most preferred outcome. If agent 2’s strategy
is undominated for a preference that puts b at the top, by Claim E.20, all strategies
of agent 1 yield the same outcome b. Finally, if agent 2 chooses an undominated
strategy for preference cab, then, by Claim E.17, the outcome that results if agent 1
chooses ˜˜s1 is a.
The only remaining case is that agent 2 has preference cba and chooses his dominant
strategy scba
2
. By claim E.17, gp˜˜s1, s
cba
2
q “ b. Thus we have to show that a RM1ps
cba
2
q.
If a P M1ps
cba
2
q, by Lemma 1, there would have to be an undominated strategy of
agent 1 with preference acb that yields a against scba
2
. In Claim E.17 we showed that
no such strategy exists. 
We can now wrap up the analysis of the second case. For five of the six possible
preferences of each agent, we have established that they have dominant strategies.
Moreover, for agents with preference acb, we have established that they have only two
undominated strategies. Moreover, the dominant strategy of agents with preference
abc is one of the undominated strategies of agents with preference acb, and agents
with preferences that put b top have the same dominant strategy. A short calculation
reveals that every agent has exactly 5 strategies. The results that we have obtained
so far show for most strategy combinations which outcome results. What remains to
be filled in is are the outcomes that result when both agents choose their strategies
scabi and s
cba
i . But because these are dominant strategies, and because we already
know that each agent has a strategy available that achieves outcome c against these
two strategies of the other agent, it must be that:
gpscab
1
, scab
2
q “ gpscab
1
, scba
2
q “ gpscba
1
, scab
2
q “ gpscba
1
, scba
2
q “ c.
Thus, there is a unique type 2 strategically simple mechanism (up to relabeling) in
the second case as shown in the right panel in the bottom row of Figure 5.
